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Management summary
This report provides information on South Africa on behalf of the implementation of the DECI-
SIONS FOR LIFE project in that country. The DECISIONS FOR LIFE project aims to raise awareness 
amongst young female workers about their employment opportunities and career possibilities, family build-
ing and the work-family balance. This report is part of the Inventories, to be made by the University of 
Amsterdam, for all 14 countries involved. It focuses on a gender analysis of work and employment.
History (2.1.1). After 1948, the authoritarian system of racial segregation under white minority domi-
nance was formalised and intensiﬁ  ed into “grand apartheid”. Skilled jobs were reserved for whites. Forced 
by the liberalisation struggle led by the ANC and under growing international pressure, in 1989 the apart-
heid regime pronounced its own death sentence. Since 1994, subsequent ANC administrations govern, ﬁ  rst 
with a free-market economic strategy (GEAR), later with a stronger public sector orientation. From 2004 
on, the GDP-per-person-employed growth pattern has been volatile.
Governance (2.1.2). After 1994, new social movements emerged, often adressing governmental failures. 
These movements, notably the women’s movement, maintain a complex relationship with the mainstream 
of the nationalist movement based on the anti-apartheid struggle. With the 2009 elections, women repre-
sentation in parliament increased to 43%.
Prospects (2.1.3). The global economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis has seriously hit the South African economy, 
with in the ﬁ  rst half year of 2009 a fall in employment of 360,000 compared to a year earlier. The economy 
remains vulnerable, especially for falling global commodities demand. 
Communication (2.2). In 2007, 42.3 million cell phones were in use, nine on each ten South Africans. In 
2008 nearly 10% of the population used the Internet. Freedom of press is rather well-guaranteed. Female 
sources are rarely used for news broadcasting.
The sectoral labour market structure – The long-term development (2.3.1). After rapid growth in female employ-
ment from 1970 on, in 1995-2000 growth in the formal sector slowed down. Afterwards, it remained limited 
to commerce, ﬁ  nance and community and related services. 
The sectoral labour market structure – Formal and informal employment (2.3.2) After growing quickly between 
1995 and 2003, informal employment stabilized. In 2007, 27% of the total workforce, 38% of the African 
workforce and 34% of all employed women worked in the informal sector. Facing that about 30% of all 
formal sector workers does not have a written contract, and with many in temporary or casual labour, we Page ● 8
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estimate for 2007 the share of core workers at 5.2 million, 38% of the labour force at large.
The sectoral labour market structure – Unemployment (2.3.3). Unemployment is especially high among African 
women and youngsters. Recently unemployment of African women (according to the ofﬁ  cial narrow deﬁ  ni-
tion) stood at 31%, and unemployment of young women at 52%. Nearly half of all unemployed women 
were new entrants to the labour market.
Legislation (2.4.1). South Africa has ratiﬁ  ed the core ILO Labour Conventions, and its laws are non-
discriminatory. Its labour legislation is highly codiﬁ  ed and complicated.
Labour relations (2.4.2). 2008 estimates point at union densities of 24% over all employed, with 20% fe-
male density, or 31% in the formal sector against 3% in the informal sector. After a series of mergers, three 
union confederations are in place, COSATU, SACOTU and CONSAWU, all ITUC afﬁ  liates.
The statutory minimum wage (2.5.1). For nine vulnerable sectors, the Minister of Labour issues minimum 
wage determinations, with levels between 19 to 72% of average monthly wages in the respective sectors. 
The lowest minimum wages are set at 125% of the upper poverty line. Jointly with the minimum wage ﬂ  oors 
in collective agreements at industry level, 85% of the female labour force is covered by regulations laying 
down minimum wages. Non-compliance with minimum wages is generally a large problem.
Poverty (2.5.2). For 2000-06, it has been estimated that 43% of the population lived under the poverty 
line of USD 2 a day. Between 1995-2000, poverty grew among the African population. From 2002 on, with 
the expansion of social grants payments, poverty decreased. Especially where access to basic services is still 
limited, the burden of poverty falls heavily on women and girls. In 2006, South Africa ranked 125th on the 
human development index (HDI), 49 places below its GDP per capita rank.
Population and fertility (2.6.1). Due to the HIV/AIDS prevalence and to emigration, population growth 
rate is falling and, with 0.3% in 2008, quite low. The total fertility rate (2.4 children per woman) and the 
adolescent fertility rate (54 per 1,000) are also comparatively low.
HIV/AIDS (2.6.2). In 2007, about 5.7 million South African people lived with HIV, and the HIV/
AIDS prevalence rate for those aged 15-49 was estimated at 18%. New HIV infections disproportionately 
affect young poor females, mostly African. Yet, progress is going on in the struggle against the pandemic; 
recently a decrease of HIV prevalence among the 15-24 of age has been found.
Women’s labour market share (2.6.3). The overall labour partication rate of the 15-64 of age is only 57%, 
and for women 50%. The female share in the formal sector was in 2007 40%, and in the informal sector 
55%. We estimate the current size of the target group of DECISIONS FOR LIFE for South Africa at Page ● 9
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about 1.4 million girls and young women 15-29 of age working in urban areas in commercial services.
Agriculture (2.6.4). Large commercial enterprises dominate agriculture, and the employment share of 
agriculture is only about 8%. Thus, young women living in cities and trying to make a career rarely can rely 
on a “fall-back scenario” in which they can go back to their families living from agriculture.
Mining and manufacturing (2.6.5). Since the late 1990s, much manufacturing work have been outsourced 
and casualised, and manufacturing has become a less promising source of employment for women. The 
ofﬁ  cial ﬁ  gures indicate that still one-third of manfacturing employment is female.
Commerce (2.6.6). Though 1970-2007 wholesale and retail trade was the largest grower, 2007-’09 wit-
nessed a serious fall in employment, especially hitting African women and men. In the 1990s practices of 
casualisation and externationalisation of labour accelerated in the retail sector.
Services (2.6.7). Already since 1970, ﬁ  nance, insurance and other business services was the fastest grow-
ing industry. Between 2007 and April – June 2009, employment growth continued, and even speeded up for 
women. The government has labeled call centres and tourism especially promising sectors, and they seem 
to realise their potential.
Government (2.6.8). In the course of the 2000s budgetary constraints lowered employment prospects in 
the public sector. Analyses show monthly wages of public sector workers being higher than comparable 
wages in the private sector at large. They also learn that the public sector has moved faster to ensure wage 
equity in terms of gender and population group than the private sector.
Literacy (2.7.1). The adult literacy rate –those age 15 and over that can read and write—was in 1999-2006 
88%. A gender gap is small or non-existent in literacy. In 2007, the literacy rate for 15-24 year-olds was set 
at 95%.
Education of  girls and young women (2.7.2). Enrollment rates in all educational types are highest for girls. For 
2007, net enrollment in primary education was 91%, with 92% for girls, though in 2000 both ﬁ  gures were 
5%points higher. Also for 2007, gross enrollment in secondary education was 87%, with 89% for girls. For 
2005, the enrollment rate for tertiary education was 15.5%, and 17% for young women.
Female skill levels (2.7.3). Whereas in 2009 50% of the female employed had completed secondary or 
tertiary education, the equivalent male share got stuck at 45.5%. Nearly 21% of employed women had com-
pleted their tertiairy education, 4%points more than men. African women have on average also attained a 
higher educational level than African men, both among employed and unemployed. Page ● 10
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Wages (2.8.1). Overall wage inequality grew between 1995 and 1998/2000, but reversed afterwards, 
though the earnings differences between population groups still grew. Since 2000, the gender pay gap has 
narrowed, but it is with 25-35% still wide. Higher education is very important in determining wages, with a 
vocational education, a degree and a postgraduate degree being most important. A vocational qualiﬁ  cation 
was found to be more important for higher wages for females than for males. Average earnings in the formal 
sector are highest in utilities and transport etc., and lowest in wholesale and retail, and construction.
Working conditions (2.8.2). A number of occupational health and safety problems persist, like resistant tu-
berculosis among mine and health care workers. Working hours are quite long, with in 2009 25% of women 
and 35% of men working more than 45 hours per week. 
Indications of  employers’ HR practices (2.8.3). The major challenge in HR policies is the need to move to 
employment equity, fair pay and skills development. Early accounts did not ﬁ  nd much progress in this ﬁ  eld. 
The adoption of new HR practices in large companies can combine with a strong union presence. Page ● 11
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Introduction: The Decisions for Life  1. 
project
The DECISIONS FOR LIFE project aims to raise awareness amongst young female workers about 
their employment opportunities and career possibilities, family building and the work-family balance. The 
lifetime decisions adolescent women face, determine not only their individual future, but also that of soci-
ety: their choices are key to the demographic and workforce development of the nation.
DECISIONS FOR LIFE is awarded a MDG3 grant from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs as part of its strategy to support the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals no 3 (MDG3): 
“Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women”. DECISIONS FOR LIFE more speciﬁ  cally focuses on 
MDG3.5: “Promoting formal employment and equal opportunities at the labour market”, which is one of 
the four MDG3 priority areas identiﬁ  ed in Ministry’s MDG3 Fund. DECISIONS FOR LIFE runs from 
October 2008 until June 2011 (See http://www.wageindicator.org/main/projects/decisions-for-life).
DECISIONS FOR LIFE focuses on 14 developing countries, notably Brazil, India, Indonesia, the CIS 
countries Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and the southern African countries Angola, Botswana, 
Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Project partners are International Trade Union 
Confederation (ITUC), Union Network International (UNI), WageIndicator Foundation, and University of 
Amsterdam/AIAS.
This report is part of the Inventories, to be made by the University of Amsterdam, for all 14 countries 
involved. These Inventories and the underlying gender analyses are listed in the Table. All reports will be 
posted at the project website. In this country report on South Africa the sequence of the sections differs 
from the table. The report covers mainly Activity nr 1.03, the Gender analysis regarding pay and working 
conditions (or, as Chapter 2 is called here, work and employment). Partly included (in section 2.4.1) is Activi-
ty 1.01, Inventories of national legislation; partly the analysis of national legislation has resulted in a separate 
product, the DecentWorkCheck for South Africa. Activity 1.02, Inventories of companies’ regulations, will 
take place through a company survey. Preparations for Activities 1.03a and 1.03b have resulted in a number 
of lists, to be used in the WageIndicator web-survey for country-speciﬁ  c questions and their analyses (Chap-
ter 3). References can be found in Chapter 4; Chapter 5 gives more insight in the WageIndicator.Page ● 12
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Table 1  Activities for DECISIONS FOR LIFE by the University of Amsterdam
Nr Inventories
1.01 Inventories of national legislation
1.02 Inventories of companies’ regulations
1.03 Gender analysis regarding pay and working conditions
1.03a Gender analysis start-up design of off-line gender analyses inventory
1.03b Gender analysis data-entry for off-line use inventoriesPage ● 13
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Gender analysis regarding work and  2. 
employment
Introduction: the general picture 2.1. 
History  2.1.1. 
Rock paintings indicate the presence of a developed human culture in South Africa already 2,600 years 
ago. The European presence in South Africa was introduced by Portuguese and English explorers, before 
the Dutch colonization of the Cape of Good Hope began in 1652 under the Dutch East India Company 
(VOC) commander Jan van Riebeeck. The British ﬁ  rst occupied the Cape in 1795. ‘Wars of Dispossession’ 
between Dutch, and later British, colonists and the indigenous Xhosa people followed. In 1834, the ﬁ  rst 
Boer descendants of the Dutch settlers began their ‘Great Trek’, leading to the establishment of the two 
Boer republics, Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The discovery of diamonds (1867) and gold (1886) 
ultimately led to the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). The defeat of the Boers (Afrikaners) was followed in 
1910 by the establishment of the Union of South Africa.
Soon, ‘Bantu’ laws and regulations were woven into the fabric of the labour code for African workers, 
directing their labour according to the desires of white authority. Most drastic was the Natives Land Act of 
1913, which gradually stripped the black African population of their right to own land, and forced them to 
remove to distant and infertile rural areas, the ‘homelands’, till over 80% of the population was restricted 
to 13% of the country’s land area. Africans were deprived from the rights to engage in collective bargaining 
and to strike, while their unions could not obtain legal status. From 1948 on, when the Afrikaner whites 
elected the Nationalist Party to power, the successive NP governments under Malan, Strijdom, Verwoerd 
and Vorster formalised and intensiﬁ  ed the authoritarian system of racial segregation under white minority 
dominance into ‘grand apartheid.’ Throughout the 1960s South Africa became a fortress of white power 
and prosperity, experiencing one of the world’s highest rates of economic growth. Based on the system 
of forced labour of expropriated blacks and their related extremely low wages, the country became lead-
ing in the exploitation of gold and other minerals and attracted massive Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 
especially from the UK, the USA, France, and Germany. A vast bureaucracy controlled the system of job 
reservation, reserving almost all skilled jobs for white workers. In the 1960s and 1970s, the government used Page ● 14
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the pass law system to push Africans out of the ‘white’ areas, resulting in over two million men circulating 
as migrants between their homes and urban employment, mostly deprived from normal family and social 
life, and millions of others commuting in packed buses and trains (Hepple 1971; Van Klaveren 1985, 1987; 
Meredith 2005).
The organized struggle for liberation had begun early in the 20th century. Milestones included the es-
tablishment of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1912 and that of the ﬁ  rst black trade union in 
1919. In the 1940s a militant mood grew among the Africans; in 1949 the ANC adopted its programme of 
action, including civil disobedience; the 1950s saw the Deﬁ  ance Campaign against the pass laws, and the 
Congress of the People agreeing upon the Freedom Charter (1955). The 1960s marked a period of heavy 
oppression, with the Sharpeville and Langa massacres and the banning of black political organizations as 
well as the arrest of leaders like Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu. In the 1970s resistance politics were 
renewed, with the revived union movement and the 1973 Durban strikes; the Black Consciousness Move-
ment (BCM) led by Steve Biko; and the organization of black students (SASO), culminating in the 1976 
Soweto uprising and consequently the student revolt – with such overcrowded townships becoming key 
grounds for political organisation. Between 1976 and 1981, the white government declared four homelands 
(Transkei, Bophutshatswana, Venda and Ciskei) ‘independent’, and about eight million Africans lost their 
South African citizenship.
The apartheid system came under increasing strain. By 1970 a serious shortage of skilled labour was 
hampering economic growth. Some white businessmen argued that scrapping the job reservation system 
and educating the black labour force was the only way out. The killing of Steve Biko and police shooting 
innocent schoolchildren fuelled the anti-apartheid movement worldwide. Though confronted with mas-
sive repression and arrests, the liberation struggle intensiﬁ  ed throughout the 1980s with the formation of 
the two trade union confederations, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU, 1985) and 
National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU, 1986), successful local consumer boycotts, and growing strike 
activity. Against this backdrop the apartheid regime, from 1978 on led by P.W. Botha, was forced to review 
the issue of black employment. It abolished the job reservation system and set up commissions of enquiry, 
resulting in laws concerning occupational safety and conditions of employment. Labour relations legislation 
that followed began to regulate strike activity, union registration, membership and activity, but retained strong 
elements of racial discrimination. Occupational barring made way for job division or outright wage discrimina-
tion against African, Coloured and Asian/Indian workers (Brookes and Hinks 2004; Ryan 2007).Page ● 15
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Botha’s moves were too little and too late. Since 1980 the apartheid economy was stuck between low 
raw material prices in the world market and the sheer cost of an expanding military and police machinery, 
including the cost of supporting the UNITA and RENAMO rebels in their efforts to undermine the new 
Angolese and Mozambican governments. Inﬂ  ation and foreign debt rose quickly, while exports, investment 
and real GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita fell from year to year. Under worldwide criticism of the 
apartheid system and at long last American and European sanctions, the migration stream of skilled Eu-
ropeans dried up. Large American and British multinationals pulled out of the country. Left alone by their 
western colleagues with a bankrupt’s estate, South African business tycoons realised they were approaching 
an abyss (Sampson 1987; Sampson 1999; Meredith 2005). Such were the conditions when, on 2 February 
1990, Botha’s successor F.W. de Klerk announced to lift the ban on the ANC and to release Nelson Man-
dela, and opened up the prospect of a democratic constitution and universal suffrage. In doing so, De Klerk 
pronounced the death sentence of apartheid (Meredith 2005, 436).
After four years of skirmishes and negotiations, a new interim constitution paved the way for national 
elections. The polls of 26 April 1994 resulted in a victory for the ANC and consequently in its majority rule, 
on the basis of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The new government was con-
fronted with ‘two nations’. For 1994, the UN Human Development Report (1996) indicated that, if white 
South Africa was treated as a separate country, its standard of living would rank 24th in the world, just below 
Spain’s, while black South Africa on the same basis would rank 123rd. Moreover, after Mandela’s inaugura-
tion as president the new government quickly found out that South Africa’s economy was in dire straits, 
with a record budget deﬁ  cit, hardly any foreign exchange reserves, and immense unemployment. Mandela 
defended the cautious and conservative economic policies of his government to the criticism of trade un-
ionists and ANC comrades. However, in the course of the 1990s it became clear that the formal sector of 
the economy could absorb few new entrants to the labour market, and that only a small share of the black 
community escaped from poverty (Meredith 2005).
Soon, the social democratic RDP was abandoned in favour of the Growth, Employment and Redis-
tribution (GEAR) economic strategy. In this orthodox restructuring program, adjustment to globalisation 
and integration in the world market, trade liberalisation and attracting FDI, were major policy targets (Car-
mody 2002). So were deregulation, privatisation of parastatal companies, and encouragement of the private 
sector—as then president Thabo Mbeki, from 1999 on Mandela’s successor, stated: “(….) we must strive to 
create and strengthen a black capitalist class” (Meredith 2005, 666). The related policy of Black Economic Page ● 16
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Empowerment (BEE), formalised by law and aiming at companies handing over ownership to black con-
sortia, met growing criticism of the COSATU union confederation and black business, arguing that only a 
small, politically connected black elite (with sometimes white tycoons behind them) beneﬁ  ted and that BEE 
did little to nurture entrepreneurship (Freund 2007; Tangri and Southall 2008; FT 2007, 2009). 
The only stated target of GEAR that has been reached is that of reducing the ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit (Aliber 2003, 
476). Furthermore, as we will see, public infrastructure like the access to safe water, sanitation and housing 
has been improved. Budgetary constraints, however, growingly frustrate further improvement. Foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) might have been important to compensate for the very low level of domestic savings 
that we already noted. In contrast, each year between 1994-2004 saw a net outﬂ  ow of FDI from the coun-
try (UNCTAD 2005). The fundamental problem was and is that South African economic growth is near-
jobless. Between 1995-2000, slow growth went hand in hand with small employment growth -- resulting 
in growing unemployment of the low-skilled Black population. A process of pro-poor (or shared) growth 
did not take off (Hoogeveen and Özler 2005, 13). Under pressure of campaigns of civil society organisa-
tions, including unions, the government introduced another economic strategy - the Accelerated and Shared 
Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGI-SA). Based on massive public works programmes (PWPs) and 
other government investment, attention to identiﬁ  ed priority sectors for accelerated growth (notably tour-
ism and call centres), and enlarged education and training efforts, the stated aim of ASGI-SA is to halve 
poverty and unemployment by 2014 (NALEDI 2004).
The years 2000-2003 showed rather abundant economic growth, driven by parallel booms of commod-
ity prices on international markets and, internally, consumer spending fuelled by increasing social grants. In 
2000, the GDP growth rate per person employed was 3.9%, in 2001 4.7%, in 2002 3.4% and in 2003 2.6%. 
A more volatile growth pattern characterized the years that followed: 2004 witnessed a negative growth rate 
of the GDP per person employed of 3.3%, followed by a recovery in 2005 of 5.0%, 2.6% growth in 2006, a 
fall of 0.2% in 2007 and 2.7% growth in 2008. From 2001-2006, the average yearly GDP growth per person 
employed was 2.5%, but the 2003-2008 average fell to 1.6% (MDG Indicator 1.4, derived from UN MDG 
Indicators) – lagging nearly 2%points behind comparable countries (peers) (Eyraud 2009). With (PPP) USD 
9,087 yearly in 2006, the South African per capita GDP in the world ranked 76th of 179 countries. A huge 
gap remained between the estimated average male income of USD 12,637 and the average female income 
of only USD 5,647 (UNDP 2008a). Thus, the 2006 ratio of the average female to male income was 0.45. 
Basically, this gap is caused by the continuous existence of ‘two nations’ (though, as we will see, there are Page ● 17
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also more subtle mechanisms at hand). The South African labour market is highly segmented, with a high-
skill tier characterized by a tight demand for white males and to a lesser extent females, while the low-skill 
tier displays an over-supply of African males and females.
The ANC has remained the majority party in subsequent national elections. The last 15 years have been 
marked by the introduction of a new constitution and extensive law reforms. In September 2008, after the 
resignment of President Thabo Mbeki; the April 2009 general elections brought Jacob Zuma as his succes-
sor in power. ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and COSATU continued their political 
alliance. The ANC Election Manifesto adopted ﬁ  ve priority areas: decent work, education, health, (ﬁ  ghting) 
crime, and rural development.
Governance 2.1.2. 
In the aftermath of the April 1994 elections, collaborative relations between state and civil society 
came to dominate. Corporatist institutions like the National Economic Development and Labour Coun-
cil (NEDLAC) were established, and non-governmental and community-based organisations (NGOs and 
CBOs) were provided representation in this forum through the establishment of a development chamber. 
Notably in the late 1990s many new social movements emerged, most of them seeking to challenge the 
emerging pro-growth consensus and to improve the situation of the poor in manifold ways; examples are 
the Anti-Eviction Campaign (2000) and the Landless People’s Movement (2001). Others, like the Treatment 
Action Campaign (TAC, 1998) and the Education Rights Project (2002), adressed governmental failures in 
delivering health and education facilities. In and through these struggles, researchers concluded in 2006, 
the state has growingly engaged with civil society, though they also point at authoritarian features in state 
behaviour (Ballard et al 2006). The shift, in the 2000s, towards more pro-poor economic policies of the 
government may be partly due to the role of social movements (Padayachee and Valodia 2008). As many of 
these movements maintain a complex and often tense relationship with the mainstream of the nationalist 
movement based on the anti-apartheid struggle, this is deﬁ  nitely true for the South African women’s move-
ment. Women’s organizations cover a wide spectrum from organizations with weak associational autonomy 
within broader struggles against oppression, like the ANC Women’s League, to organizations like the United 
Women’s Organization (UWO) and the Women’s National Coalition (WNC) undertaking more independent 
action (Hassim 2006).Page ● 18
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The representation of women in politics is a major issue in the country. The general elections of July 15, 
2009, resulted in an increase of women representation in parliament to 43%, 9% up compared to the 2004 
general elections and taking the fourth place worldwide in this respect.1 An analysis of the role of gender in 
the 2009 elections by the GenderLinks and Gender and Media Southern Africa (GEMSA) networks argues 
that this outcome has largely been achieved as a result of the commitment by the ANC to the 50/50 gender 
principle (Morna et al 2009). The networks found a number a positive developments, for example: women 
comprised 55% of those registered to vote; 41% of the newly appointed ministers are women; of the 14 
ministries headed by women, eight are in non-traditional sectors; the election promoted unprecedented me-
dia debate in previously no-go areas, for example as to what extent the personal is political. Concerns raised 
include facts that the female share in deputy ministerial posts has fallen considerably; that the leadership 
in parliament is now heavily male dominated; that the main opposition party, Democratic Alliance (DA), 
despite being led by a woman (Helen Zille), remains averse to quotas and has formed a 75% male cabinet 
in the East Cape, and that ANC and DA in and after their campaigns used sexist slurs for cheap political 
point scoring. 
The networks report their particular concern of the weak state of the National Gender Machinery. 
Previously, it is argued, the Ofﬁ  ce of the Status of Women resided in the presidency, where it could per-
form a cross-cutting function. President Zuma has announced a Ministry of Women, Youth, Children and 
Disability, in line with other line functions. This proposal is regarded as problematic, especially because of 
the combination of women’s and children’s affairs (Lowe Morna et al 2009, 6). The South African leg of 
the MDG3 campaign has been launched in April 2008 in Cape Town (Sowetan 2008). The ﬁ  rst MDG3 
workshop in South Africa targeted gender-based violence (IPS Africa website). As far as we could trace, the 
South African government did not speak explicitly in favour of the MDG3 campaign, most likely as it may 
regard the attainment of MDG3 goals in line with its policies regarding the empowerment of women.
Over 2008, the US Dept of State reported that the South African government generally respected 
the human rights of its citizens, but it was added that the government, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and local media reported the following serious human rights problems: police use of excessive 
force against suspects and detainees, which resulted in deaths and injuries; vigilante and mob violence; abuse 
of prisoners, including beatings and rape, and severe overcrowding of prisons; lengthy delays in trials and 
1  Thus coming closer to the targets set by the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development for achieving 50% in all areas of 
decision-making by 2015.  The campaign for the adoption, ratiﬁ  cation and impllementation of the SADC Protocol is run by 
the Southern African Gender Protocol Alliance, a collective of over 40 national and regional gender NGOs (see Genderlinks 
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prolonged pretrial detention; forcible dispersal of demonstrations; pervasive violence against women and 
children and societal discrimination against women and persons with disabilities; trafﬁ  cking in persons; 
violence resulting from racial and ethnic tensions and conﬂ  icts with foreigners; and child labour, includ-
ing forced child labour and child prostitution. These problems were extensively documented (US Dept 
of State 2009a). Indeed, Amnesty International reported over 2008 that police responded to a number of 
public protests against poverty and unemployment with excessive force and arbitrary arrests. The rights of 
non-nationals held in police and immigration detention continued to be abused and asylum-seekers faced 
barriers in accessing asylum determination procedures. Violence against women, including rape, was said 
to be prevalent and barriers to access to protection and justice persisted (website Amnesty International). 
Though between 2004-2007 rape as reported (!) to the SAPS, the South African Police Service, decreased by 
12%, the level of gender-based violence (rape in 2007: 75.6 per 100,000 of the population -- SAPS website, 
category rape) remains extremely high in international perspective. The female homicide rate is six times 
the global average, and 50% of these women are killed by partners. 28% of men admit to have raped (The 
Lancet 2009).
Prospects 2.1.3. 
The global economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis has seriously hit the South African economy. During the ﬁ  rst 
quarter of 2009, South Africa’s annualised GDP fell by no less than 6.4%, especially due to decreasing sales 
of manufacturing and mining (SSA 2009c). In the ﬁ  rst half year of 2009, nearly a quarter of million jobs 
were shed in elementary occupations, mainly in these two sectors. In total, employment fell by 360,000 com-
pared to a year earlier. The number of employed men fell by 300,000, the number of employed women by 
60,000 – meaning that by gender the number of unemployed became at par, after a long period with more 
female than male unemployed. However, the number of unemployed women even fell, by 140,000, whereas 
150,000 unemployed men, mainly ‘job losers’, were added. Obviously large numbers of women and men 
–but relatively more women-- withdrew from the labour market and/or were labeled ‘discouraged work-
seeker’. Between April-June 2008 and April-June 2009, the number of such discouraged work-seekers grew 
by 440,000 (220,000 women and 220,000 men) and the incidence of not economically active increased by 
285,000 (150,000 women and 135,000 men) – among which an increase of 156,000 home-makers. At the 
same time, there was a shake-out of 550,000 informally employed, among men (minus 13%) and women 
(minus 9%) as well as across all age groups (authors’ calculations, based on SSA 2009b and LFS data put at 
the disposal of AIAS by Statistics South Africa).Page ● 20
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Till mid-2009, the burden of the crisis in terms of employment fell nearly exclusively on Blacks Afri-
cans: amongst them, the number of employed fell by 370,000. In 2008-09 the racial differences in unem-
ployment rates became even more marked, notwithstanding the withdrawal effects of the current crisis. 
Whereas the overall unemployment rate (according to the ofﬁ  cial, narrow deﬁ  nition) in April-June 2009 was 
23.6%, African workers were confronted with 27.9% unemployment as against 19.5% for Coloureds, 11.3% 
for Indians/Asians and 4.6% for Whites (all ﬁ  gures: SSA 2009b). Moreover, the unexpected lift of inﬂ  ation 
in 2008 –ofﬁ  cially 11.5%, with food and transport price inﬂ  ation much higher—has resulted in real wage 
losses. Trenton Elsley of Labour Research Services (LRS) has calculated that average workers in 2008 lost 
about 3% of their purchasing power (Paton and Naidoo 2009). The widespread strikes and social unrest in 
South Africa in mid-2009 have to be projected against the backdrop of these and related developments.
Since April 2009, nearly all leading economists and international institutions have been growingly pes-
simistic about the prospects of developing countries, including South-Africa, confronted with the crisis. A 
World Bank research note as of that month clearly states: “The global economic crisis is exposing house-
holds in virtually all developing countries to increased risk of poverty and hardship”, adding “While in the 
short-run, the non-poor may be the most affected by the crisis, experience from past economic and ﬁ  nancial 
crises suggests that the adverse impacts are likely to spread in the medium-term to poor households.” The 
note ranks South-Africa among the 40 or so developing countries with high exposure to the poverty effects 
of the crisis, be it that according to the World Bank experts the country’s budget leaves substantial room 
for additional funding domestically and from abroad without jeopardizing macroeconomic stability or debt 
sustainability (Cord et al 2009). This position has enabled an expansive ﬁ  scal policy to combat the crisis. 
While this may be a strong side of the government’s answer, the weak side of the country undoubtedly is its 
reliance on exports, which account for nearly two-thirds of the GDP. Thus, diminishing global demand and 
falling commodities prices may take a severe toll on the economy (Ali 2009). In this process, structural weak-
nesses in the South African economy, notably the underperformance of investment –both internal as from 
abroad—and the low rate of private saving (Eynaud 2009), will most likely come out as more pronounced 
and may hamper a recovery. Under these conditions, meeting the MDG employment goals for 2015 will be 
a near-impossibility; “In order to meet these goals, around 700,000 jobs are to be created per annum”, bank 
economist Shireen Darmalingam recently commented (IOL News 2009).Page ● 21
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Societal prospects in South Africa look rather gloomy in the face of the thin line between violence and 
political protest that seems to have left in the country. In July 2009, it has been observed by Adele Kirsten, 
executive director of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), that in the depths of 
an unusually cold winter, the poor, feeling increasingly marginalized while expecting to ﬁ  nd representation 
and sympathy for their plight, and the newly elected Zuma government seemingly unwilling to listen, are 
seeing protest as the only viable alternative. “It’s like violence is the only thing the government listens to,” 
Kirsten concluded. Another expert, Loren Landau, Director of the Forced Migration Studies Programme at 
the University of the Witwatersrand, commented: “What’s going on now reﬂ  ects two governance challenges 
that have gone unaddressed for too long: the ﬁ  rst is less about service delivery than about managing ex-
pectations, and encouraging people to express their grievances (legitimate or otherwise) peacefully through 
community or political institutions.” The second concerned the treatment of non-nationals, and a growing 
fear that violent protesters would increasingly target foreigners, often blamed for ‘stealing’ jobs, women and 
houses. Landau argues that the xenophobic violence that swept through South Africa in 2008 --killing at 
least 62 people and displacing 100,000 others- would return if nothing was done to address its root causes 
(UN IRIN 2009).
Communications 2.2. 
Adequate communication facilities are absolutely essential for the DECISIONS FOR LIFE project. In 
South Africa, ﬁ  xed telephone lines were in 2007 4.6 million in numbers, of which the bulk in urban areas, 
which means nearly one ﬁ  xed line on each 10 South Africans. As everywhere in Africa, cellular phones 
have become much more widespread, with in 2007 already 42.3 million cell phones in use, implying nine of 
these phones on each 10 South African inhabitants. Most of the subscribers are in the pre-paid category. 
The combined ‘teledensity’of jointly ﬁ  xed and cell phones is one on each member of the population. The 
telephone system is generally assessed as the best developed and most modern in Africa, but tariffs are high 
by international comparison and clearly a substantial burden for the poor (CIA World Factbook; Open 
Society Foundation 2007, 168-171, 176). In 1996, TELKOM, the parastatal telecom company, was partially 
privatised and entered into a consortium with private companies. In exchange for a ﬁ  ve-year period of mo-
nopoly, TELKOM assumed an obligation to facilitate network modernisation and expansion into unserved 
areas. Yet, ﬁ  xed-line prices spiralled and for poorer individuals and communities ﬁ  xed lines remained out of 
reach. In fact, the limitations of the ﬁ  xed-line network impacted signiﬁ  cantly on the roll-out of broadband Page ● 22
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services and the spread of cell phones (Open Society Foundation 2007, 171). The renewed TELKOM mo-
nopoly was breached in 2005, but has interlocking interests with the black empowered owners of the three 
call phone companies (Freund 2007).
Internet coverage in South Africa has reached, in global perspective, medium-range level. In December 
2008 the country was estimated to have 4,590,000 Internet users,2 or 9.4% of the population. Moreover, 
by September 2008 there were 378,000 broadband Internet subscribers (website Internetworldstats). In 
December 2007, the country had the very large number of 1,197,088 internet hosts -- 65% of Africa’s total, 
against 5% of the population of the continent (website The Internet in Africa).
According to the South African Advertising Research Foundation, print media in 2008 reached 46% of 
the population. Nevertheless, the majority received news through radio broadcasts from the government-
owned South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and community radio stations. The SABC broad-
casts in the country‘s 11 ofﬁ  cial languages; it owns and controls the majority of television and radio outlets. 
In 2008, the SABC signal reached 92% of the population, with a viewership share of 66% over the age of 
16. SABC estimated that 75% of its audience was black, 12% white, 10% coloured, and 3% Indian (US Dept 
of State 2009b). A recent research report raised concerns on a culture in SABC of self-censorship as well 
as on board members trying to interfere in the daily operations of SABC. The report conﬁ  rmed worries of 
the SABC management concerning funding, a continuation of its situation under apartheid, with the vast 
majority of the Corporation’s funds coming from advertising – bemoaning the effects on the depth and 
length of news broadcasting (Open Society Foundation 2007, 107, 112-8).
Low power, nonproﬁ  t community radio stations continued to play an important role in informing 
the mostly rural public; however, they often had difﬁ  culty producing adequate content and maintaining 
staff. Government broadcast regulators regularly issued new community radio licenses and withdrew oth-
ers for noncompliance with the terms of issuance. Privately owned E.tv was the second largest channel in 
the country with a terrestrial signal reaching 81% of the population. It was also the most-viewed English 
language channel with a viewership of 38% over the age of 16. E.tv estimated that 70% of its audience is 
black, with the highest growth segment being viewers from the black middle class; 13% is white, 13 % col-
oured, and 4% Indian (US Dept of State 2009). Unfortunately, recent ﬁ  gures on access to the mass media 
by gender are lacking.
2  The CIA World Factbook mentions for 2005 already 5.1 million internet users.Page ● 23
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From 1997 on, the Universal Service Agency (USA), a state-related institution, rolled out Community 
Telecentres in under-serviced areas, providing access to basic electronic services like telephones, computers, 
faxes and copying facilities. The Community Telecentres met a number of organizational problems as well 
as lack of signal coverage. In 2006, USA claimed the existence of 133 telecentres countrywide; most likely 
about two of three may have been fully functional. Besides, in 2005 71 Multi-Purpose Community Centre 
(MPCC) telecentres were in existence in rural areas. Accessibility for the black population depends ﬁ  rst and 
foremost on the availability of public transport (Open Society Foundation 2007, 159-161, 197).
Concerning the freedom of press, the US Dept of State reported over 2008: “The constitution and law 
provide for freedom of speech and of the press, and the government generally respected these rights. In-
dividuals criticized the government both publicly and privately without reprisal. However, several apartheid 
era laws that remained in force posed a potential threat to media independence (….) High ranking govern-
ment and political ofﬁ  cials on occasion reacted sharply to media criticism and accused black journalists of 
disloyalty and white journalists of racism. Some journalists believed that the government’s sensitivity to 
criticism caused self censorship in the media.” It can be added that there are no government restrictions on 
access to the Internet or reports that the government monitored e-mail or Internet chat rooms. Individuals 
and groups could engage in peaceful expression of views via the Internet, including by e-mail (US Dept of 
State 2009a). News content analysis in 2006 for seven radio stations and SABC and e.tv TV stations reached 
rather positive outcomes. Over 96% of all items monitored were fairly reported, thus challenging views that 
notably the SABC is biased in favour of government, ANC and/or employers. According to the researchers, 
98% of all stories across the media monitored provided the essential context and facts. Yet, they also noted 
a lack of in-depth information, like in covering human rights issues. Of great concern were the low levels of 
female sources accessed (Open Society Foundation 2007, 130-3, 140). Analysis of the media coverage of the 
2009 elections conﬁ  rmed this picture, with women constituting a mere 24% of news sources (MMA, cited 
in Morna et al 2009, 35). Within the union movement, there seems quite some concern anout the rather low 
union proﬁ  le in the audiovisual media (cf. Ndungu 2007).Page ● 24
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The sectoral labour market structure 2.3. 
The long-term development 2.3.1. 
Table 2 shows the long-term development of employment in South Africa.3 Combined with earlier Cen-
sus data, a rapid growth of female labour market participation can be traced for the 1960s and between 1995 
and 2000. In 1960 women (excluding domestic workers) accounted for 23% of the labour force in South 
Africa (Casale and Posel 2002, 158). By 1970 this share was 32%, in 1995 34%, to stabilize at about 41% 
from 2000 on (including domestic workers at 44%).4 The table shows that –leaving out domestic workers-- 
between 1970 and 2000 employment increased by 46%, from about 7.5 million to just over 11 million. While 
in these three decades the growth for men was 33%, female employment grew by no less than 129%. After 
the end of apartheid, between 1995 and 2001 about 3.2 million women became economically active (broadly 
deﬁ  ned), partly in wage employment, yet more than half of them ‘making work’ for themselves in the infor-
mal sector (Casale and Posel 2002; Casale 2004). Men followed suit, with in the early 2000s some hundreds 
of thousands moving into self-employment (Kingdon and Knight 2007). Indeed, in the 2000s the growth 
pattern by gender reversed. From 2000 to 2007 employment growth was quite modest, 10.2% in total, but 
with 7.6% female employment grew even slower than men’s 11.4%. As said, recently the worldwide crisis hit 
the South African economy seriously. From September 2007 to April-June 2009, female employment fell by 
0.8% (to 5,973,000 persons) and male employment even by 2.1% (to 7,397,000 -- SSA 2009b).
3  Long-term employment trends in South Africa are rather difﬁ  cult to disentangle because of changes in deﬁ  nitions and in 
coverage of both the Census and the October Household Survey (OHS) as of 1993, as well as the introduction of a new 
household survey, the Labour Force Survey (LFS) in 2000.  Such changes have had negative implications for the comparability 
over time of developments in the female labour force (Casale and Posel 2002, 160-1). 
4  In April-June 2009, following the decrease in notably male employment between 2007-2009, the female share nearly reached 
45% (SSA 2009b).Page ● 25
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Table 2  Employment*) by industry and gender, South Africa, 1970 – 2007, x 1,000 headcount 
  (aged 15-64), September
1970 2000 2007
 M F tot. M F tot. M F tot.
1. Agriculture, ﬁ  shing etc.  1,593 889 2,482 819 543 1,362 498 272 770
2. Mining 674 7 680 417 14 431 299 24 323
3. Manufacturing 811 215 1,025 1,039 661 1,754 1,304 637 1,941
4. Utilities 45 2 47 67 12 79 61 23 84
5. Construction 464 12 476 652 57 709 959 135 1,093
6. Wholesale and retail trade **) 513 195 708 1,411 1,484 2,896 1,663 1,747 3,410
7. Transport, storage, commun. 310 28 338 585 100 684 577 157 734
8. Finance, insurance, business 115 75 190 609 412 1,021 842 605 1,447
9. Community, social, pers.serv. 585 1,011 1,596 883 1,220 2,103 1,062 1,478 2,540
10. Domestic workers - - - 234 1,036 1,297 323 943 1,266
11. Total 5,109 2,433 7,542 6,770 5,566 12,336 7,558 6,020 13,609
12. Total excl. 10 and 11 5,109 2,433 7,542 6,536 4,530 11,039 7,235 5,077 12,343
%services ((6+7+8+ 9) : 12) x 
100 30% 54% 38% 53% 71% 61% 57% 78% 66%
Sources: 1970: Bhorat 2000, 445; 2000 and 2007: Statistics South Africa 2009a
*) employers, employees and self-employed5
**) incl. repair of  motor vehicles, motor cycles and personal and household goods; hotels and restaurants
Concerning industries, between 1970-2007 the largest grower in employed numbers for men and wom-
en equally has been wholesale and retail trade (including the repair activities and hotels and restaurants), but 
this ended abruptly in the period April – June 2007 to April – June 2009 with a drop in employment of 13%, 
while the decrease for women was even 16% (men 10%). Moreover, percent-wise employment in ﬁ  nance, 
insurance and other business grew even quicker – again, for men and women alike—as well as continued to 
grow in 2007-’09, by 18%, with 29% growth for women (and 10% for men -- SSA 2009b). In 1970-2000 the 
female shares increased in all industries except in agriculture and in community, social and personal services. 
In the latter industry the male labour force showed an astonishingly large growth. Between 2000-2007 the 
female shares grew everywhere except in manufacturing; here, employment initially increased for both sexes, 
but fell after 2000 for women. The two primary sectors (agriculture and ﬁ  shing etc. and mining) showed a 
large drop in employment, though it should be noted that the 1970 ﬁ  gure includes both commercial agri-
culture and small-scale agriculture and that the 2000 and 2007 ﬁ  gures for domestic workers may hide about 
300,000 persons mainly living on subsistence agriculture. Yet, the decrease in non-subsistence agricultural 
employment remains considerable; before 2000 this drop has been especially detrimental for African men 
(Bhorat 2000, 444-5), in the 2000s for African men and women alike. As the last row of the table shows, 
South Africa has made the transition to a service economy, with most recently two-thirds of employment 
5  South African labour force statistics do not systematically provide (sub)divisions by employment status. In April – June 2009, 
85% of all employed women were employee (men: 84%), 3% employer (men: 7.5%), 11% own-account worker (men: 8%), 
and 1.5% (men: 0.5%) unpaid household member (SSA 2009b, 14).Page ● 26
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in services (in its wide sense, including the public sector: rows 6, 7, 8 and 9). The services industry already 
dominated female employment in 1970, by then making up 54% of the female labour force and growing to 
even 78% in 2007 (and to 79.5% in April – June 2009), and it ﬁ  nally did with male employment: in 2007 as 
well as in 2009 services accounted for 57% of the male labour force.
Formal and informal employment 2.3.2. 
We now turn to informal employment. While for quite some time there was no clear deﬁ  nition in South 
Africa of ‘informal sector’, workers in domestic service, casual wage employment and self-employment have 
mostly been included. The apartheid system repressed the informal activities of black South Africans. Even 
after 1994, when many restrictions were lifted, there were lingering licensing controls and restrictive by-
laws in many urban centres. After the end of apartheid, governmental business support concerning crime 
prevention, infrastructure, business assistance, credit and training facilities neglected the informal sector 
(Kingdon and Knight 2004, 403-4). Jointly with the restrictions and the disempowerment of Africans under 
apartheid inhibiting the development of entrepreneurial skills and social networks, this may explain why the 
share of the informal sector in South Africa’s labour force remained an outlier compared to the much larger 
share in the other sub-Saharan countries (Kingdon and Knight 2007, 824). 
In the run-up to the 2004 national elections, the government claimed that “the economy created two 
million net new jobs since 1995”. A reconsideration of this claim clariﬁ  es that less than 40% of the total 
increase in employment of 2.2 million was in wage employment in the formal sector (Casale et al 2004, 10). 
Indeed, recently revised time series of Statistics South Africa suggest that between 1994 and 2000 informal 
labour has spread widely. They indicate that in 2000 the informal sector absorbed about 35% of the labour 
force. In 2007, however, this proportion had decreased to 27%. The use of an alternative deﬁ  nition of 
‘informal’ does not change this picture. It has been argued that the growth, against all odds, of the infor-
mal sector was a sign of the failure of the formal wage sector to create enough jobs for a rapidly growing 
labour supply. The researchers in question found for the period 1995-2003 labour supply (or ‘broad labour 
force’) growing yearly by 4.8%, while wage employment only expanded by 1.3% per year. By contrast, self-
employment grew annually by 11.2% (Heintz and Posel 2008). 
The development of earnings may serve as additional proof for the “failure of the wage sector” thesis. 
While in 1997-2003 real wages in the formal sector decreased by 0.5% per year, at the same time real in-
comes in the informal sector fell much more, by 7.8% yearly. And to use another yardstick: in 2003 42% of 
the informal self-employed earned less than the USD 2 a day poverty line, as against 19% of all employed Page ● 27
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(Kingdon and Knight 2007, 822; Casale et al 2004, 12, 18). By the end of this period, in 2003, 60% of 
those in the informal economy had monthly earnings lower than R1,101, as well as 93% of the –separately 
counted-- domestic workers, against a quarter of those in formal employment (derived from ALRN 2004, 
20). Moreover, in the current crisis the vulnerability of informal work is emphasized. We already noted that 
between April-June 2008 and April-June 2009, the number of informally employed fell by 550,000. Espe-
cially the young men and women aged 15-25 and the men aged 55-64 were hit, with employment losses of 
19-22% in one years’ time (based on SSA 2009b and LFS 2009 data put at the disposal of AIAS by Statistics 
South Africa). Thus, there is overwhelming evidence that in South Africa informal employment is not a way 
of alleviating poverty.
Table 3  Employment*) by sector, industry and gender, South Africa, 2007, x 1,000 headcount (
  aged 15-64, Sept.) 
males females
formal informal total formal informal total
Agriculture, ﬁ  shing etc.  384 114 498 272 196 272
Mining 298 1 299 23 1 24
Manufacturing 1,190 114 1,304 507 130 637
Electricity, gas, water supply 56 5 61 23 0 24
Construction 600 358 959 97 38 135
Wholesale and retail trade 1,210 452 1,663 1,091 656 1,747
Transport, storage, communication 454 123 577 140 17 157
Finance, insurance, other business 788 55 842 574 31 605
Community, social, personal serv. 973 89 1,062 1,330 148 1,478
Private households**) 0 323 323 0 943 943
Total 5,954 1,635 7,588 3,980 2,040 6,020
Source: Statistics South Africa 2009a
*) employers, employees and self-employed
**) counted as a separate category by Statistics South Africa, largely covering domestic workers, here included under ‘infor-
mal’
Table 3 shows employment in 2007 by industry, gender and sector, divided in formal and informal la-
bour, based on the Statistics South Africa revised time series. Following these ofﬁ  cial ﬁ  gures, in September 
2007 1.6 million men, 21.5% of all males employed, and just over 2 million women, 34% of all, were em-
ployed in informal labour. Besides in private households (100%), informal employment was widespread in 
agriculture and ﬁ  shing (40%), construction (36%), and wholesale and retail trade (32%). Jointly the whole-
sale and retail trades and private households accounted for nearly two-thirds (2.3 million of 3.6 million) of Page ● 28
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all in informal employment.6 In 2007, less than 10% of the respective Coloured, Indian/Asian and White 
people of working age were employed in the informal sector, against 38% of the African labour force (de-
rived from SSA 2009a).
It cannot be emphasized enough that the (statistical) division between formal and informal employ-
ment used in this report to provide insights in the South African labour market is rather artiﬁ  cial. Over the 
last two decades, in many industries the boundaries between formal and informal are blurred in terms of 
workers’ wage and job (in)security. A substantial part of formal sector work is growingly non-standard or 
‘non-core’ i.e. is subject to processes of casualisation (full-time jobs being replaced by low-pay casual jobs), 
externalisation and/or informalisation, to subcontractors or various forms of labour intermediaries like 
labour brokers,7 aiming at saving on labour costs. Well-known examples are from manufacturing, like from 
the automotive industry, but less widely known are many cases from as various industries as mining and 
wholesale and retail (Theron 2005; Bodibe 2006). The number of formal-sector workers employed in the 
standard employment relationship under more or less stable conditions, like clear and written contracts and 
transparent wages, is eroding gradually. It has been estimated for 2003 that by then about 6.1 million workers 
belonged to such a ‘core’ (Von Holdt and Webster 2005, 2008). If we take into consideration that according 
to the 2005 Labour Force Survey 30% of all workers in the formal sector did not have a written contract, 
14% had a temporary contract, and over 8% was in casual labour (SSA 2005b), an estimate of the number 
of core workers for 2007 may end up with only about 5.2 million, or 38% of the labour force at large. This 
outcome is just a rough indication: in South Africa the linkages, including labour ﬂ  ows, between the formal 
and informal economy are manifold, shifting and difﬁ  cult to grasp. 
6  In 2008,  Statistics South Africa re-deﬁ  ned informal employment as to consist of those in the informal sector, plus employ-
ees in the formal sector and persons working in private households who do not have a written contract of employment, and 
whose employers do not contribute to a medical aid plan or a pension on their behalf. Deﬁ  ned this way, in April-June 2008 
56% of all South African women employed were in formal employment, 41% in informal employment and 3% in other em-
ployment (which refers to employers and own-account workers who are not in the informal sector). Again, men were more to 
be found in the formal sector: their shares were 62%, 32% and 6% respectively (SSA 2008a).
7  A labour broker is the Southern African equivalent of a temporary or private employment agency. Following ﬂ  exibility provi-
sions in recent South African labour law (LRA and BCEA), the broker remains the employer of the procured worker: there 
is no employment relationship with the client-employer. Legally there is no time limit to which a worker placed with a client 
is deemed to remain temporary. Unless legal provisions, many brokers do not register. The combination of these elements 
obviously leads to the serious undermining of workers’ rights, not least of the rights to join a union and to engage in collective 
bargaining. A trade union video accounts to where this can lead: “Most of the workers were initially employed by [newspaper 
company], but when the company outsourced its services to the labour broker, their wages dropped, their security of employ-
ment disappeared and beneﬁ  ts like provident fund and medical aid vanished. Critically in this new employment relationship, 
opportunities for exploitation and harassment have grown tenfold. A number of women workers recount how male supervi-
sors demand and receive sexual favours in order to secure some women places in the daily or weekly shifts” (Ndungu 2009, 
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Unemployment 2.3.3. 
Since the 1980s the counting of unemployment is a hot issue in South Africa. In 1998, Statistics South 
Africa declared a narrow deﬁ  nition of unemployment (excluding the unemployed who wanted work but did 
not search actively in a 4-week reference period) the ofﬁ  cial one, opposite to a broad measure (including 
this group). In 1999 this made a difference between 23 and 36% unemployed. Researchers have argued that 
under the South African conditions the broad measure of unemployment is a more accurate reﬂ  ection of 
(structural) joblessness than the narrow one (ALRN 2004, 18; Kingdon and Knight 2000, 2007). Obviously, 
voluntary unemployment is rather rare; on average unemployed are substantially worse-off than the infor-
mally employed – both in terms of income and in terms of well-being—but many have given up searching 
for a job (Kingdon and Knight 2007, 828-9).
After democratization, unemployment increased largely. Using the narrow deﬁ  nition, between 1995-
2003 it grew from 17 to 28%; using the broad one from 29 to 42%, and for Africans according to the broad 
yardstick even from 37 to 49%. While at that time urban unemployment among Africans was already quite 
high, with rates of 41% for men and 53% for women, the rural ﬁ  gures were even higher, with respectively 
45% of men and 58% of women unemployed – implying that in both urban and rural areas over half of 
all African women that were able to work were unemployed (NALEDI 2004). Moreover, the share of 
long-term unemployed remained large. While in 1994 long-term unemployment (of more than one year) 
accounted for 67% of the unemployed, in 2000 this proportion had even grown to 71%. By that time, three 
of ﬁ  ve of the 5.25 million unemployed –three million people!-- claimed never to have worked before. Even 
three of four jobless between the ages of 15 and 30 had never worked (Brookes and Hinks 2004; ALRN 
2004, 19). In the course of the 2000s the share of long-term unemployed in total unemployment fell to 58% 
in 2007, to climb most recently again to 60% in April-June 2009 (SSA 2008a, 2009b). 
Unemployment is especially high among African women and youngsters. In April – June 2008, the 
unemployment of African women (according to the narrow deﬁ  nition) stood at 31.1%, against 23.4% for 
African men. Among the various population groups, the picture continued which showed unemployment 
rates for women being consistently higher than those for men: coloured women 21.3% against 17.9% for 
coloured men; Indian/Asian women 15.7% against 10.8%, and white women 5.8% against 3.6% for white 
men. Thus, in the second quarter of 2008, the unemployment rate among African women was more than 
eight times that of white men (SSA 2008b). Youth unemployment remains at a disquieting high level too. 
In April – June 2009, 679,000 young women aged 15-24 were registered as unemployed, against 620,000 Page ● 30
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employed, implying the extremely high unemployment rate (narrow deﬁ  nition!) of 52%. For the young men 
aged 15-24 the respective ﬁ  gures were 703,000 unemployed against 869,000 unemployed, bringing their 
unemployment rate to nearly 45%.8 In the second quarter of 2009, the inactivity rates of the 15-24-years 
old were 71.8% -- 74.1% for girls and young women, and 68.8% for boys and young men. By detracting a 
maximum of 57% students (that is, all students imputed to this age group), it follows that at least 15% of 
all youngsters outside the employed and the ofﬁ  cially unemployed had no clear productive activity or means 
of existence. Moreover, it is a bad sign that, of those 15-24 of age employed, in April – June 2009 the large 
proportion of 38% (36% of the young women and 40% of the young men employed) was employed infor-
mally. A year earlier this proportion was even 42% (authors’ calculations, based on SSA 2009b and LFS 2009 
data put at the disposal of AIAS by Statistics South Africa).
All these ﬁ  gures are proof for the poor employment record of the GEAR program. The public works 
programmes (PWPs) did not provide sustainable employment, and participation merely temporarily reduced 
the depth of poverty. The enactment of the National Skills Act (1998) and the creation of sectoral training 
authorities (SETAs) in 1999 does not seem to have given a boost to companies’ training activities. Moreover, 
large numbers of workers are unable to pay training costs by themselves. The bottomline continues to be the 
slow growth rate of the economy. This slowness is combined with a system of strict labour regulation that 
does not seem quite appropriate to tackle the South African conditions of huge unemployment and sharp 
labour market segmentation (Kingdon and Knight 2007, 836-43; Orr 2003, 31). 
A closer look at the 2008 unemployment statistics learns that 40% of all unemployed, and even 45% of 
the unemployed women, were new entrants to the labour market. No less than 1.6 million (53%) of the 3.0 
million unemployed aged 15-34 years were new entrants. Across educational categories, this proportion hardly 
differed (SSA 2008a). Once more these ﬁ  gures underline the inability of the South African economy to ab-
sorb young entrants. Dias (2006) has convincingly linked these problems with developments in education and 
employer behaviour. She argues that by 2003 there was hardly any gap in education between the employed 
and the unemployed searching jobs of 16-25 years of age. It seemed paradoxical: the younger cohorts in the 
labour market had gained more schooling than older cohorts, but had higher rates of unemployment. In the 
early 2000s the completion of secondary schooling (having a matric qualiﬁ  cation) did not enhance the prob-
ability of ﬁ  nding work. At the same time the level of this qualiﬁ  cation was questioned – and still is. A grow-
ing number of matriculants chose –and choose-- for standard grade matric qualiﬁ  cations that required less 
8   In April-June 2009, unemployment rates for the next higher age group, the 25-34 of age, were 31% (women) and 24% (men) 
(authors’ calculations, based on SSA 2009b and LFS 2009 data put at the disposal of AIAS by Statistics South Africa).Page ● 31
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demonstration of the analytical skills of the candidate. First, in the perception of employers, this might have 
rendered the matric less useful as a screening device in judging the future productivity of a worker. Second, 
matriculants were less likely to have previous work experience and this might provide another explanation for 
their unemployment. Dias suggests that, to the extent that a lack of experience creates a barrier to employ-
ment for individuals with formal qualiﬁ  cations, the learnership programmes developed by the Department of 
Labour may provide a means of breaking a vicious cycle. These learnerships provide ﬁ  rms with tax incentives 
to hire and train unemployed individuals whilst on ﬁ  xed term employment contracts (Dias 2006, 29).
National legislation and labour relations 2.4. 
Legislation 2.4.1. 
South Africa has ratiﬁ  ed all eight core ILO Labour Conventions 29, 87 , 98, 100, 105, 111, 138 and 182 
(ITUC information). Its labour legislation is highly codiﬁ  ed and complicated. After the ﬁ  rst democratic elec-
tions, the signiﬁ  cant rewriting of labour laws resulted in four key pieces of legislation: the Labour Relations 
Act (LRA) of 1995 (amended in 2002); the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) of 1997 (also 
amended in 2002), the Employment Equity Act (EEA) of 1998 (amended in 2006), and the Skills Develop-
ment Act (SDA) of 1999. The new 1996 Constitution of South Africa provides for the right to join trade 
unions, and to unions to collectively bargain and strike. However, the current LRA limits the right to strike; 
workers engaged in ‘essential services’ (e.g. electricity workers and doctors) have no right to strike while 
other so called ‘ordinary workers’ may not engage in strikes in support of secondary issues unless they go 
through an elaborate court process (Orr 2003, 39; NALEDI 2008, 46).
The 1996 Constitution explicitly seeks to eliminate unfair discrimination (sections 9(1) and 9(2)). The 
new labour legislation sets a framework for the removal of unfair discrimination in employment and Hu-
man Resource practices, by the promulgation of the unfair labour practice provisions in Schedule 7 of the 
LRA, the prohibition against unfair discrimination in the EEA, and similar provisions in the Promotion of 
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (1999). Generally, an employer is required to prove 
that discrimination is not unfair. The EEA does not set quotas, but rather enables individual employers to 
develop their own plans, especially concerning recruitment and selection and remuneration (Horwitz et al 
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The BCEA and its amendments establish, enforce and regulate the basic conditions of employment; 
it sets the minimum ﬂ  oor of rights for all those working at least 24 hours a month with a single employer. 
Among other things, the BCEA entitles workers to:
(employment contract): a written particulars of employment (contract), including among others, the    ●
names of the employer and employee, place of work, wage and rate of payment, and the date of termi-
nation of employment if applicable (section 28)
(paid annual leave): the employer is required to grant an employee full annual leave of 21 consecutive days    ●
on full pay for every year of work. Otherwise the leave is calculated on a pro-rata basis of either one day 
of annual leave for every 17 days of work, or one hour of annual leave for every 17 hours of work (sec-
tion 21)
(paid sick leave): sick leave is calculated in a cycle of 36 months (three years) and is approximately 30 days.    ●
However, in the ﬁ  rst six of employment, the employee is entitled to approximately 7 days of sick leave 
(section 22)
(maternity leave): pregnant workers are entitled to at least four consecutive months of maternity leave. An    ●
employee mist not work for six weeks after delivery, unless a doctor or midwive certiﬁ  es that she is ﬁ  t to 
do so (section 25)
(paid family responsibility leave): family responsibility leave only applies to an employee who has been    ●
working for an employer for more than four months, or works for at least four days a week. Paid family 
responsibility leave is granted for at least three days during each year of employment, and reasons may 
include the following: when the employee’s child is born; when the employee’s child is sick; in the event 
of the death of the employee’s spouse, life partner, parent, adoptive parent, grand-parent, child, adopted 
child, or sibling (section 27)
(maximum working hours) if the maximum number of days worked per week is ﬁ  ve, the maximum ordi-   ●
nary hours per day is nine; if the maximum number of days worked per week is more than ﬁ  ve, the maxi-
mum ordinary hours per day is eight; in both cases, the maximum ordinary hours per week is 45 (section 
9)
According to the union movement, the coming into being of the BCEA has not always implied progress, 
like in the case of maternity beneﬁ  ts.9 While setting a minimum of four months maternity leave, the law im-
posed this on the Unemployment Insurance Fund that had until then allowed women six months paid beneﬁ  ts 
9 Maternity  beneﬁ  t is equal to 45% of the insured’s weekly earnings and is paid for a total of 17 weeks (6 weeks in the event of 
a miscarriage or a stillborn child). The beneﬁ  t is payable from 18 weeks before and up to 8 weeks after the expected date of 
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(Orr 2003, 40). More generally, employers’ compliance with labour legislation is worrisome. We already pointed 
out that in 2005 30% of all workers in the formal sector did not have a written contract. Moreover, 39% of 
them reported having no paid leave; this was not only the case for 78% of domestic workers, but also for 40% 
of those working in wholesale and retail, 21% of those working in ﬁ  nance etc., and even 20% of those working 
in community, social and personal services (SSA 2005b). Speciﬁ  cally concerning maternity leave, unions have 
argued for many years that vulnerable workers struggle to effect this right in practice (Orr 2003, 40). 
As for social security, currently pension and related fund contributions are not mandatory, but all em-
ployers must make contributions on behalf of their employees to the Unemployment Insurance Fund 
(UIF). By September 2005, almost half of all workers (46%) reported having no deduction of UIF contri-
butions, while 69% said they did not have medical aid beneﬁ  ts covered. In wholesale and retail trade, the 
latter proportion was even 85%, but even in ﬁ  nance and other business services it was 64%. We already 
noted that 39% of all workers surveyed reported having no paid leave (SSA 2005b). It also should be taken 
into account that, because of their qualifying conditions, social insurance beneﬁ  ts are tied up to the formal 
economy, limiting the number of beneﬁ  ciaries seriously.10 
Labour relations 2.4.2. 
Based on the LRA, South Africa has developed a two-tiered collective bargaining structure that includes 
single unions voluntarily bargaining at company and plant level, and Bargaining Councils (before 1995 
Industrial Councils) that consist of registered trade unions and employers’ associations within a particular 
industry, occupation or area. They deal with collective agreements, attempt to solve labour disputes, and 
bring forward proposals on labour policies. They may also administer pension funds, sick pay, and unem-
ployment and training schemes. According to LRA section 32, a Bargaining Council can request the Minister 
of Labour to extend a collective agreement to non-parties which fall within its jurisdiction. Moreover, the 
Amended LRA prescribes that the Councils are to extend their services and functions to workers in the 
informal sector and to home-workers. The BCEA and its amendments establish, enforce and regulate the 
basic conditions of employment; it sets the minimum ﬂ  oor of rights for employees in the South African 
labour market. At top level, NEDLAC, the country’s tripartite social partnership, has been constituted. It 
monitors labour, economic and social development policies. Further relevant bodies include the Council for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), and the Labour Courts (Casale and Posel 2008; Bhorat et 
10  Sickness and maternity beneﬁ  ts are paid to eligible insured workers working more than 24 hours a month, the unemployed, 
or workers with earnings reduced to no more than one-thirds of the regular wage. For these beneﬁ  ts, the insured must have 
at least 13 weeks of contributions in the 52 weeks before the incapacity began respectively before the expected date of child-
birth.Page ● 34
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al 2009a). The primary function of the CCMA is to conciliate and arbitrate disputes. It is widely being ac-
claimed to have made workplace justice more accessible and less costly for common workers. The number 
of cases processed by the CCMA increased rapidly, to nearly 130,000 in 2005/’06. About 70% of all cases 
regarded unfair dismissal (Bhorat et al 2009b). 
Following processes of merging of old as well as the creation of new unions, actually three trade union 
(con)federations are in existence: COSATU, SACOTU (FEDUSA and NACTU), and CONSAWU. All three 
(respectively four) are ITUC afﬁ  liates. We will now go into their characteristics.
The oldest and largest union confederation, COSATU, was formed in 1985. COSATU has 21 afﬁ  liated 
unions, by November 2008 jointly organizing 1.8 million members (ITUC information). From the very be-
ginning the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) has been a major force in COSATU; created in 1982, 
the NUM was deeply involved in the anti-apartheid struggle. In 1990 the South African Congress of Trade 
Unions (SACTU), formed in 1954 and subsequently growing into the (underground) trade union arm of the 
ANC, dissolved and advised its membership to join the COSATU unions. Like through organising strikes, 
COSATU contributed substantially to the end of the apartheid regime. COSATU’s strongholds continue to 
be in the export-oriented manufacturing and mining industries. A 2004 survey among COSATU members 
in these industries revealed a high level of participation in union affairs and effective shopﬂ  oor organisa-
tion (Wood and Glaister 2008). COSATU boasts the afﬁ  liation of the country’s four single largest unions: 
the NUM, with currently over 270,000 members; SADTU, the teachers’ union (224,000); NUMSA, the 
metalworkers’ union (216,000), and NEHAWU, the health and education workers’ union (200,000) (Global 
Union Directory). COSATU membership shows a shift towards higher-skilled workers and the public sec-
tor. Actually, about one-third of its members are in the public sector and nearly one-quarter are degreed 
professionals (Paton and Naidoo 2009).
COSATU is in alliance with the ANC and the SACP. Though this political alignment is a recurrent sub-
ject of debate within COSATU, it prevents the prospect of forming a single-union confederation: FEDUSA 
and NACTU have dispelled any possibility of merging with a confederation that is politically aligned. In 
the past the COSATU leadership has been at odds with the government on various occasions, like on the 
need to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Already in 1998, the COSATU congress passed a resolution to 
campaign for treatment and greater public access to antiretroviral drugs (wikipedia; see also section 2.6.2). 
Recurrent issues for debate were and are also economic government strategies. In the mid-2009 strike move-
ment, again, COSATU took a stand rather independent of government policies. COSATU back in 1986 Page ● 35
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launched a Living Wage Campaign; from 1999 on this campaign has been included in the confederation’s 
broader Jobs and Poverty Campaign. In 2007, COSATU’s General Secretary expressed the need of the 
Living Wage Campaign to be expanded to the sectors regarded vulnerable, including the retail, security and 
cleaning sector (Zwelinzima Vavi in Ndungu 2007, 16). COSATU has a strong women wing. The 2009 CO-
SATU National Gender Conference resolved concerning collective bargaining, among other issues: unions 
to push for the implementation of employment equity legislation, prioritizing the employment of women 
in traditionally male occupations; eliminating barriers to women’s employment including parental rights, 
childcare and other facilities; develop conscious and focused strategies to organize young women workers; 
campaigns and collective bargaining on issues that affect women such as gender-biased violence, sexual 
harassment, reproductive health and HIV/AIDS. The Conference urged the federation to continue to build 
strong civil society linkages with women’s movements locally, nationally and internationally (Google website 
COSATU news).
After long deliberations and a full year behind schedule, in November 2007 the South African Confed-
eration of Trade Unions (SACOTU) was launched, as the result of the policy –not administrative-- merger 
of the NACTU and FEDUSA confederations. Its policy integration conference decided that its ﬁ  rst presi-
dent would be the former female FEDUSA president, Mary Malete. In June 2009, the new confederation 
claimed 890,000 organized (SACOTU website), but in November 2008 ITUC set membership on 360,000 
for FEDUSA and 310,000 for NACTU (in the international ﬁ  eld obviously still operating separately). From 
the outset labour relations watchers perceived the merger as the swallowing up of NACTU, smaller (by the 
time 300,000 members) but having historically more in common with COSATU, by the larger, more moder-
ate and ‘whiter’ FEDUSA. At the same time it is recognized that the current SACOTU membership is over-
whelmingly black (Mde 2006). The largest SACOTU afﬁ  lates are PSASA, the public servants’ association 
(180,000); UASA, the United Association (85,000); IMATU, organizing mainly municipal workers (73,000), 
and HOSPERSA, the health and other services union (50,000)(Global Union Directory). SACOTU’s basic 
policy documents emphasize gender equality as well as decent work and decent life objectives (SACOTU 
2007). 
Another confederation, CONSAWU (Confederation of South African Workers’ Unions), spawned in 
2003, uniting 21 smaller, earlier independent, unions and rooted in the christian tradition in unionism. By 
November 2008, membership was set at 290,000 (ITUC information). Solidarity, with about 130,000 mem-
bers, was the driving force behind the creation of CONSAWU and remains its largest afﬁ  liate. In an earlier Page ● 36
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stage the NACTU and FEDUSA merger talks included CONSAWU, but this confederation was excluded 
because of the alleged right-wing alignment of a CONSAWU afﬁ  liate (SACOTU 2007, 4). Initially, the new 
confederation claimed to have 400,000 members, and applied to be admitted to the NEDLAC, the tripar-
tite social partnership. NEDLAC, requiring a 300,000-member threshold for admission, rejected the new 
confederation. Subsequently, CONSAWU took NEDLAC and the three other union confederations to the 
Labour Appeal Court, as to challenge the ‘unfair’ rejection. Recently the ﬁ  nal refusal of recognition is linked 
in CONSAWU pamphlets to a cry for decent work and freedom of association: “We have witnessed in the 
Republic of South Africa derogations from these standards and fundamental rights” (CONSAWU website).
After the ban on Black unions was lifted, between 1985 and 1995 union membership grew rapidly, as did 
wages in unionized companies and industries. In the mid-1990s, African unionised workers received a wage 
about 20% higher than that received by non-unionised African colleagues with the same characteristics; be-
sides, non-unionised workers that were covered by an Industrial (now Bargaining) Council agreement enjoyed 
a 7 – 10% wage premium (Schultz and Mwabu 1998; Butcher and Rouse 2001; Bhorat et al 2009a). Ten years 
later, in 2005, workers being part of both a union and a Bargaining Council enjoyed a wage premium of over 
15%. This result was primarily driven by the fact that almost 95% of workers in the public sector were now 
covered by Bargaining Councils, among which many organized workers. The years 1995-2000 witnessed a 
strong decrease in union density, from 38% (2,006,000) of all Africans aged 16 and older in wage employ-
ment to 32% (1,886,000). Nevertheless, the research results show that union membership continues to have 
a strong effect on determining wages in South Africa – though recently Bargaining Council coverage also 
proved to be critical. Moreover, both union and Bargaining Council coverage served to reduce wage inequal-
ity (Bhorat et al 2009a, 52, 63; see also section 2.5.1). 
From 2000 on, the number of African union members grew to 2,110,000 in 2006, but employment of 
Blacks expanded much stronger. The initial decrease in union density after democratisation was especially 
large among African women (10%points, from 36 to 26% in 2000), and more moderate among African men 
(from 39 to 36%). Then, the decrease of union density to an overall 30.5% in 2006 was to be attributed to 
a falling male density, of 33.4% in 2006, with female density remaining constant. Recently the female den-
sity rate remained 6 to 7%points behind the male rate. The density rates for Coloured, Indian/Asian and 
White employees are most likely 7-11% points lower than those of African employed (wikipedia). Organized 
women are relatively high educated, and this notably holds for Black women. Earlier, in 2003, nearly half of 
all unionised African women were teachers and nurses (Casale and Posel 2008 – compare with a 13% share Page ● 37
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of these two occupational groups in the female workforce). Though notably COSATU unions have made 
efforts to organize women in low-skilled, often informal jobs, like in clothing production, in retail (notably at 
Shoprite’s and Woolworth’s -- Von Holdt and Webster 2008; ITUC 2009a) and in security and contract clean-
ing (NALEDI 2008), it is unlikely that this picture has basically changed since. 
Table 11 provides a detailed overview of trade unions in South Africa. The most relevant unions for the 
DECISIONS FOR LIFE target group may be:
afﬁ  liated to COSATU: South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers’ Union (SACCAWU),    ●
and The Finance Union (SASBO);
afﬁ  liated to SACOTU (FEDUSA and NACTU): Banking, Insurance, Finance and Assurance Workers    ●
Union (BIFAWU); Care Centre, Catering, Retail & Allied Workers’ Union (CCRAWUSA); Hotel, Liq-
uor, Catering, Commercial and Allied Workers (HOTELLICA); Insurance and Banking Staff Associa-
tion (IBSA); National Services and Allied Workers Union (NSAWU), and South African Communica-
tions Union (SACU);
afﬁ  liated to CONSAWU: Federal Council of Retail and Allied Workers (FEDCRAW); South African    ●
Food, Retail and Agricultural Workers’ Union (SAFRAWU), and Transport Action, Retail & General 
Workers’ Union (THOR).
Based on the latest membership indications of the three/four confederations and those of independ-
ent unions, we conclude to a total union membership in South Africa in 2008 of about 3.2 million; thus, we 
can estimate total union density to be about 24% of all employed. The female density can be estimated at 
20% (sources: Global Union Directory, union websites). Due to differences in employment deﬁ  nitions (the 
denominator), these ﬁ  gures cannot be straightforwardly compared with earlier ones. Unionization remains 
largely bound to the formal sector. We estimate for 2008 the union density in the formal sector at 31%, 
against about 3% in the informal sector. It is unlikely that more than 130,000 informal workers are organized 
(sources: Global Union Directory, union websites; earlier outcomes in Orr 2003 and SSA 2005b). Recently 
a researcher of NALEDI, COSATU’s research institute, argued that “While an ever increasing number of 
workers has been casualised, outsourced or informalised, unions have concentrated on the shrinking pool 
of core-workers for survival” (Ndungu 2009, 8).
As for sectors, the 2005 Labour Force Survey found the highest union density (79%, 1995: 71%) in the 
mining and quarrying sector. Well organised were also the community, social and personal services (57%, 
1995: 41%); utilities (56%, 1995: 41%), and manufacturing (though showing a large decrease: 38%, against Page ● 38
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46% in 1995). Lower, though by international comparison not that low, were density rates in ﬁ  nance etc. 
(24%, 1995: 21%) and in wholesale and retail trade (24%, as well as 24% in 1995). The lowest and second 
lowest were the rates among domestic workers (3%, 1995: 1%) and agriculture and forestry workers (10%, 
1995: 7%) respectively. With 11% (1995: 19%), the level of organization was remarkably low in the con-
struction sector (2005: SSA 2005b; 1995: Orr 2003). The above ﬁ  gures show over the period 1995-2005 
that, while density rates fell in manufacturing and construction, union strength increased in the public sec-
tor, utilities, and ﬁ  nance etc. Within the formal sector, unionization concentrates in larger workplaces. While 
in the mid-2000s unionized enterprises accounted for about 40% of all formal enterprises, roughly 75% of 
workers in enterprises employing 150 people or more were unionized. In larger workplaces the major unions 
have a representation through elected shop stewards. These unionized enterprises include those in highly-
export-oriented industries, as organized by NUMSA and NUM. Research shows that workers in these in-
dustries are no less militant than their domestically oriented counterparts (Wood and Glaister 2008).
Among the organizations representing employers are the South African Chamber of Business and its 
regional afﬁ  liates; Business Unity South Africa, which was formed by the 2003 merger of the Black Business 
Council and Business SA, and many regional, local and sector-speciﬁ  c employer bodies (Ryan 2007).
Wage-setting and minimum wage 2.5. 
The minimum wage 2.5.1. 
Wages can be set in South Africa basically in three ways: in the statutory system of wage determination 
through the Bargaining Councils and through sectoral determinations made by the Minister of Labour, and 
–outside that system—in centralised bargaining fora as well as decentralised at company (single-employer) 
and plant level. There is no national (statutory) minimum wage, but the Basic Conditions of Employment 
Act (BCEA) permits the Minister of Labour to set minimum terms and conditions of employment, includ-
ing minimum wages. Thus, ministerial sectoral determinations are in place in areas of economic activity 
where labour has been deemed vulnerable by the Department of Labour (DOL), based on a process of 
research and consultation between the relevant employers and employees in the sector and DOL. The Min-
ister is not allowed to publish a sectoral determination covering employees and employers who are already 
covered by a collective agreement concluded at a Bargaining Council. Actually, sectoral determinations are 
in place for nine areas (website SA Dept of Labour / page payslips): Page ● 39
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domestic workers    ●
contract cleaning   ●
private security sector   ●
wholesale and retail   ●
farm worker sector   ●
forestry sector   ●
taxi sector   ●
learnerships   ●
children in the performance of advertising, artistic and cultural activities   ●
The minimum wage amounts included vary widely, according to location, function, years of experience, 
and working hours. After quite some investigation, we found out that there are currently about 1,800 differ-
ent minimum wage rates, based on the sectoral determinations alone. Upratings are mostly calculated three 
to four years in advance, and are normally ﬁ  xed for one year. For example, from 01/02/2009 to 31/01/2010 
in wholesale and retail the lowest minimum wage rates (for a General Assistant) are set in Area A at R 1,947 
per month respectively in Area B at R 1,676 per month, and the highest rates (for a Manager) are R 4,697 
per month in Area A and R 3,754 per month in Area B. We calculated the rates of these minimum wages 
determined by DOL to be between 19 to 72% of the 2008 average monthly wages (excluding bonuses and 
overtime) in the respective sectors, excluding domestic and farm workers (based on SSA 2009c). Overall, 
the lowest minimum wages are set at 125% of the upper-bound national poverty line (in 2008 prices). It has 
to be noted that the minimum wages determined by DOL are far from easy to be traced. Some rates seem 
outdated, or at least publication in the Government Gazette is lagging behind decision-making on uprating. 
These practices add considerably to the fact that, as local experts emphasize, non-compliance with mini-
mum wages is generally a large problem. Moreover, DOL has hardly any control capacity; in the last decade 
its staff of labour inspectors has been nearly halved (Ndugu 2007).
Based on 2007 employment ﬁ  gures the sectors with minimum wage determinations jointly covered 
about 5.5 million workers: 40% of the South African workforce, of which about 3,050,000 women, 50.5% 
of the female workforce. In the determinations for some sectors, higher minimum wages are speciﬁ  ed for 
those with lower working hours. In domestic services, for example, employees who work less than 28 hours 
a week are entitled to an hourly wage which is about 10% higher than that earned by employees working 
longer hours. In wholesale and retail, the minimum hourly wage for individuals working fewer than 28 hours Page ● 40
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a week can be even 25% higher than the hourly wage speciﬁ  ed in the sectoral determination for their oc-
cupation. A possible motivation for these higher hourly wages may be to offset the lower level of beneﬁ  ts 
received by those working fewer hours per week (Posel and Muller 2008, 472).
In collective agreements at industry level via the agency of Bargaining Councils minimum wage ﬂ  oors 
are set too. Within industries, such minimum wages may also vary by location and often by occupation. 
As mentioned, the Minister of Labour may declare these minimum wages extended to employers in the 
industry and area, who were not parties to the negotiations. While in 2005 32% of formally employed work-
ers was covered by Bargaining Councils, only 4.6% was covered by extensions. In 1995, still only 15% of 
workers were covered by the (then) Industrial Committees. In between, the system expanded in the public 
sector. The formalisation of teachers, nurses and other public sector professionals into the Public Sector 
Co-ordinating Bargaining Council has had a positive effect on the earnings of females (Bhorat et al 2009a, 
33-6). If our calculations are correct, in 2007 77% of the South African labour force, including 85% of the 
female labour force, might formally have been covered by regulations laying down minimum wages.
For some categories of South African workers laying down minimum wages has had substantial positive 
effects. Between 2001-2005, the monthly median wages of the elementary occupations increased by 65%, 
against an (unweighted) average increase for all nine occupational groups of 18%. This coincided with the 
extension of minimum wage legislation to industries not previously covered (Hlekiso and Mahlo 2006, 9, 
16). In September 2002, roughly one million domestic workers – about 840,000 predominantly African and 
Coloured women who are working as housekeepers, cooks and nannies, and another 180,000 men who work 
primarily as gardeners-- were granted formal labour market protection, and two months later a schedule 
of minimum wages went into effect. These regulations do appear to have raised wages. Average nominal 
hourly wages for domestic workers in September of 2003 were 23% higher than they had been in Septem-
ber 2002, while for similar workers in other occupations the nominal increase was less than 5%. There was 
some decrease in employment, but that was not clearly related to the wage increase. Despite substantial non-
compliance, for many low-paid women the minimum wage made a difference (Hertz 2004). 
Poverty 2.5.2. 
South Africa’s social indicators perform relatively poor for a country with a GDP per capita in the 
upper-middle income ranks. For 2000-06, UNDP (2008a) estimated that 42.9 % of the South African popu-
lation lived under the poverty line mostly used by the United Nations, that is below USD 2 a day (in PPP 
terms, that was R174 in 2000 prices), and that 26.2% had to make ends meet with an income below the other Page ● 41
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international poverty line, USD 1 (PPP) a day. If the extreme poverty yardstick of USD 1 is applied, South 
Africa is doing better than the other sub-Saharan countries (compare: Angola 54%, Zambia 64%, Malawi 
74%, Mozambique 75%) (MDG Indicator 1.1, derived from UN MDG Indicators).11 Yet, all available ﬁ  gures 
still point at widespread poverty in the country. 
Taking into account the (relatively high) South African consumer price levels, poverty is even more 
widespread than the use of the USD 2 and USD 1 yardsticks might indicate. Through a ‘cost-of-basic-
needs’ approach, normative poverty lines for South Africa have been calculated on 322 Rand (lower-bound) 
and 593 Rand (upper-bound) per capita per month in 2000 prices.12 Using the lower-bound poverty line of 
R322, the researchers in question found for 1995 and 2000 that at least 58% of all South African house-
holds, and more than two-thirds of the African population, were poor in either year. Yet, they also found 
between 1995 and 2000 an increase of the incidence of extreme poverty, with 2.3 million more living on less 
than USD 2 a day.13 Over this period, Coloureds made signiﬁ  cant gains against poverty, but inequality grew 
because of a sharp increase in poverty among the Black population. The greatest increases in poverty took 
place in those provinces encompassing the most populous former homelands as well as in Gauteng, in 1995 
the least poor province (Hoogeveen and Özler 2005, 8-10, 22). 
Obviously the poorest did not gain much –if anything at all-- from economic growth in the ﬁ  rst six 
years after democratization. In 2000, the poorest 10% of the population had a share of 1,4% in national 
consumption, and the poorest 20% had a share of 3.5%, the latter being slightly less than in 1995 (MDG 
Indicator 1.3, derived from UN MDG Indicators and UNDP 2008b).14 Focusing on individual (instead of 
household) incomes, in 1995-2000 for both genders a massive real income decline has been found of about 
40%. At the same time women systematically entered and men systematically left the labour market. For 
Black women, downward income pressure as they were forced to work in low-income generating informal 
labour is the most likely explanation. They growingly entered into competition with Black male workers 
for low-skilled jobs, and thus –jointly with the rapid decline of mining and related manufacturing employ-
ment-- put pressure on male earnings (Leibbrandt et al 2005, 4, 34; Casale and Posel 2002; Casale et al 2004). 
11  Statistics South Africa (SSA 2005a) presented lower ﬁ  gures: 34.4% living below USD 2 a day, 11.3% living below USD 1 a 
day. UNDP (2003) suggested that in 2002 4.7 million South Africans, or 11.0% of the population, lived below USD 1 a day. 
For reasons of international comparability, we use here and in our other country reports primarily the UN MDG Indicator 
outcomes concerning the incidence of poverty.
12  The upper-bound poverty line includes an additional R271 for non-essential non-food items. 
13 Conﬁ  rmed by Statistics South Africa, which noted an increase of the population share under USD 1 a day of 7.6% in 1995 
to 11.3% in 2000 (And of the share under USD 2 a day of 30.9% in 1995 to 34.4% in 2000 -- SSA 2005a). Other authors, 
starting from a poverty line of about USD 3 a day,  found that the share of the poor stabilized or fell slightly over 1995-2000, 
though the number of poor increased with maximum 1.1 million because of population growth (Van der Berg and Louw 
2004, 567).
14  Statistics South Africa (2005a) presented for 2000 a lower ﬁ  gure (2.8%).Page ● 42
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Mobility out of poverty seems to have been considerable, but mobility into poverty as well, and obviously in 
the 1990s both movements were of the same magnitude. Research in KwaZulu-Natal suggested that about 
one-third that were poor in 1993, found themselves above the (about USD 2 a day) poverty line ﬁ  ve years 
later. If this outcome might be generalized, about two-thirds of the poor can be called chronically poor. 
The largest groups of chronically poor households and individuals are: rural poor (in 2000 about 1 million 
households); female-headed households (see below); elderly; ex-farm workers; migrants; street homeless, 
and AIDS orphans (Aliber 2003).
According to the Income and Expenditure Survey of households 2005/06 (IES2005), by then the con-
sumption levels of 33% of all households and 47% of all individuals were below the lower-bound poverty 
line. In 2005, the share of poorest 20% of the population in the national consumption was 4.1%. Though 
because of changing deﬁ  nitions comparison with the statistics of 1995 and 2000 is difﬁ  cult, these ﬁ  gures 
seemed to point at a decrease of poverty between 2000 and 2005-06.15 Along race lines, the share below 
the lower-bound line was by far highest among Blacks (55%), followed by Coloureds (34%) and Indians 
(7%), while only a very small share of whites (0.4%) fell below this line. Along this yardstick over 93% of all 
poor individuals was black. Again, the incidence of poverty was by far highest in the rural areas, mostly the 
overcrowded former homelands, with poverty rates more than double those for urban areas. Hence, nearly 
60% of all poor households and individuals were rural dwellers, despite the fact that urbanisation is well 
advanced in South Africa, with in 2005 only 35% of all households (and 41% of the population) living in 
rural areas (Armstrong et al 2008; Aliber 2003). 
Using data from a (semi-)annually market research survey provides evidence that both average and me-
dian real incomes from 2002 on increased substantially. Blacks and Coloureds were the primary beneﬁ  ciaries 
of the rapid and massive expansion of the South African social safety net. Between 2000-01 and 2004-05, 
social grant payments doubled, rising by some R22 billion in real terms (while the total income of the poor 
in 2000 was R27 billion). The bulk of the additional grant spending came in the form of assistance for 
households with children, with the age limit for eligibility for the child support grant gradually being raised 
from seven to 14 years. The number of beneﬁ  ciaries of the disability grant nearly doubled, while foster care 
grant and care dependency grant beneﬁ  ciaries also increased strongly. If nothing else was different, the inci-
dence of poverty among households would have been 10.7%points higher in 2005 had the various types of 
social grants not existed. Improvements in job prospects for Blacks between 2004-’07 played an additional 
role in increasing real average earnings for this group. Since the turn of the century the incidence of poverty 
15  According to IES2005, in 2005-06 53% of households and  68% of individuals consumed less than the upper-bound line. Page ● 43
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has shown a marked decline. A larger, more multi-racial middle class has emerged (Van der Berg et al 2008, 
66-70; also: Armstrong et al 2008, 21-2).
For 2006, South Africa ranked 125th in a total of 179 countries on the human development index (HDI) 
of the UNDP (expressing life expectancy, education and per capita income), after a disquieting decrease 
of 0.017%-points during the period 2000-2006. The 2006 ranking was slightly higher than Botswana, but 
more widely above the rates for other sub-Saharan countries. Also for 2006, the South African ranking on 
the Gender-adjusted Development Index (GDI) was, with position no. 108 among 157 countries, about 
the same. Botswana, again, followed on no. 109 closely, while the other sub-Saharan countries remained at 
wider distance (UNDP 2008a). According to the UNDP ratings, the 2006 HDI rank of South Africa was 
49 places below its GDP per capita rank – the world’s ﬁ  fth largest difference between the two social and 
economic rankings. 
Indeed, the exceptionally unequal income distribution in South Africa is a major reason for its compara-
tively poor social performance. This is so despite the declining incidence of poverty from 2000 onwards. 
In terms of the Gini coefﬁ  cient, an income distribution measure that rates 0 as perfect equality and 100 as 
perfect inequality, inequality estimates for 2004-05 vary between 0.67 and 0.72 (Van der Berg et al 2008, 69; 
Armstrong et al 2008, 5)16: still making South Africa one of the most unequal countries in the world. In 2005 
the poorest 10% of households (17% of the population) accounted for 1.7% of total consumption, mean-
ing some progress compared to the 1.4% of 2000, but still awfully low compared to the 46% share of the 
richest 10% of households (which comprised less than 6% of the population --Armstrong et al 2008, 5-6). 
As we already indicated the UN Human Development Report (1996) calculated for 1994 that, if white 
South Africa was treated as a separate country, its standard of living would have ranked 24th in the world, 
while black South Africa on the same basis would have ranked 123rd. In 1994, 55% of households lacked 
adequate sanitation and 30% clean water supply; 58% had no access to electricity. Progress in this ﬁ  eld in 
the next decade has been obvious. Over 3 million subsidized houses have been built, including 2.7 million 
houses for the poor (ANC 2009). In 2007, only 7% was in lack of access to a clean (in UN terms improved) 
drinking water source, fully concentrated in rural areas where 13% lacked such water sources (WHO 2009). 
According to the IES, in 2005/06 31% of households had no access to piped water, 41% lacked adequate 
sanitation and 19% had no access to electricity. However, these outcomes also conﬁ  rm that the burden 
of poverty --through the lack of access to services—continues to fall heavily on the chronically poor, and 
among them especially on girls and women. To give just two examples: in 2005-06 three of four of the poor-
16  This is the Gini coefﬁ  cient without taking social transfers into account. If these are taken into account, the Gini for 2004-05 
may fall to about 0.38 (cf. SSA 2005a).Page ● 44
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est 20% had no adequate sanitation and 36% no electricity (UNDP 2008a; Armstrong et al 2008, 17). In rural 
areas, only 49% of the population had access to improved sanitation, against 66% in urban areas (WHO 
2009). The hours of unpaid labour performed by women increase dramatically in case of limited or lacking 
access to basic services. As Statistics South Africa surveys reveal, notably collecting water and ﬁ  rewood is a 
very time-consuming job for women and girls17 ; the continuous need to spend much time in collecting these 
essentials will impact negatively on the education and social development of girls (cf. Orr 2003, 32).
Clearly, female-headed households are overrepresented among those below the lower-bound poverty 
line. In 2000, over 750,000 female-headed households were estimated to be chronically poor (Aliber 2003). 
In 2005-06, their situation does not seem to have been improved. For these years it was reported that 45% 
of all female-headed households –about 1,3 million-- lived below the lower-bound poverty line, compared 
to 25% of male-headed households. In 2005-’06 of the poorest 20% of households, 53% were female-
headed, against 39% of all households. As regards age, the incidence of poverty generally increased with the 
age of the head of the household. The only exception was the group of households headed by 15-to-24-
year olds, with a poverty rate of already 28%, compared to the overall rate of 33% -- – an indication of the 
consequences of persistent youth unemployment in South Africa. The rate for those aged 25-34 was 24% 
(Armstrong et al 2008, 13-15). With rank 108, for 2006 the South African Gender-adjusted Development In-
dex (GDI) was somewhat higher than its overall HDI ranking (125th), but low compared to the neighbouring 
countries as well (UNDP 2008a). For 2008 the Gender Gap Index of the World Economic Forum ranked 
South Africa 22nd of 130 countries. For economic partication and opportunity, South Africa only ranked 
93th, in educational attainment 45th, in health and survival 67th and concerning political empowerment 9th 
(Hausmann et al 2008). 
Finally, and without any apologies for criminals, there is extensive evidence of a relationship between 
widespread poverty, high unemployment and social marginalisation on the one hand and violence and crime 
on the other. In the ﬁ  rst eight years of democratization, crime has risen jointly with unemployment and 
poverty. For instance, the South African Police (SAPS) website showed that between 1994–‘95 and 2002-’03 
reported common robbery doubled; “robbery with aggravating circumstances” even more than doubled 
and reported burglary of residential premises increased by 29%. At the turn of the century, the expression 
was not exaggerated that murder, rape and other forms of gender-based violence, robbery, hijacking, and 
burglary were commonplace (cf. website CSVR). It has to be acknowledged that between 2002-‘03 and 
17  The Quarterly Labour Force Surveys of 2008 and 2009 report that on average about 3 million persons were regularly involved 
in “Fetching water or collecting wood/dung” (SSA 2008a, 2009b). Girls and women will make up the large majority of the 
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2007-’08 the reported incidence of most crime categories decreased, like common robbery by 37%, and 
robbery with aggravating circumstances by 12%. As said, after 2004 rape cases reported to the police fell 
by 12% as well. Yet, at the same time drug-related crime nearly doubled. Moreover, in 2007-’08 robbery at 
business premises and truck hi-jacking increased by nearly 50% (SAPS website, crime data). Thus, it may not 
come as a surprise if formal sector employers and those operating in the informal sector, including many 
women, will continue to list crime on top of their constraints for sound business – as they already did in a 
number of surveys. In the end, high crime rates might produce a vicious circle: they will contribute to less 
business activities as well as to a brain drain, and thus contribute to poverty and unemployment (cf. Kingdon 
and Knight 2007). 
Demographics and female labour force 2.6. 
Population and fertility 2.6.1. 
For mid-2009, the population of South Africa is estimated at 49.052,000, of which about 24,607,000 
females (50.2%) and 24,443,000 males. The average yearly population growth rate for 2005-2008 was 0.9%, 
but in 2008 this growth rate had fallen to 0.3% (derived from various Statistics South Africa surveys and 
CIA World Factbook). The estimated 2009 median age is low: 24.4 years – 24.1 for males and 24.8 years 
for females. The considerable share of 28.9% of the population is 0-14 years, while 65.8% is in the work-
ing age group of 15-64-years-olds (CIA World Factbook). All these ﬁ  gures are heavily inﬂ  uenced by the 
excess mortality due to the HIV/AIDS pandemic: see our next section. Of course, this also holds for the 
comparatively high death rate, to be estimated at 17.0 per 1,000 population for 2009 (CIA World Factbook). 
Whereas the South African infant mortality rate (IMR) is much lower than in other sub-Saharan countries 
and in recent years falling considerably, it certainly is not negligible. Various ﬁ  gures for the IMR circulate, in 
2003-’05 ranging from 42.5 to 56 per 1,000 live births (Ryan 2007, 20), but the UN has set the 2005 average 
at 55 per 1,000 (UNDP 2008b). This average hides huge differences, in 1998 from 62 per 1,000 live births 
for the poorest 20% of the population to 17 per 1,000 for the richest 20% (UNDP 2008b). Infant mortality 
is eight to ten times higher for Africans than for whites (Aliber 2003, 475). A second applicable yardstick 
here is the under-ﬁ  ve mortality rate (U5MR). Overall progress is evident: for 2007, the U5MR rate was set 
for South Africa at 59 per 1,000 live births, against 74 in 2000 and 68 in 2005. The U5MR rate, too, is much 
lower than the rates of the other sub-Saharan countries. But, again, the within-country differences are huge, Page ● 46
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in 1998 ranging from 87 per 1,000 live births among the poorest 20% till 22 per 1,000 for the richest 20% 
(UNDP 2008a, b).
For 2009, the estimated birth rate in South Africa is 19.9 per 1,000. Its total fertility rate (TFR) is rapidly 
declining, from 5.5 children per woman in 1970-1975, via 2.8 in 2000-2005 (UNDP 2008b), to an estimated 
2.4 children per woman in 2009 (CIA World Factbook): moderately low in worldwide perspective, and fall-
ing below the replacement rate that for South Africa can be estimated at 2.6. The TFR varies considerably 
across population groups: according to the 2001 Census, the rate was 1,7 among Whites, 1.9 among Indians, 
2.3 among Coloureds, and 3.0 among Africans (Worku-Yergou  Belay 2007). For an indication of the situa-
tion of the target group of DECISIONS FOR LIFE, the adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women 
15-19 of age) is of special importance. For 2007, the World Health Organization (WHO 2009) set this rate 
for South Africa at 54 – except for Botswana, the lowest ﬁ  gure among the sub-Saharan countries. In 2001, 
the adolescent fertility rate for African women stood at 55 per 1,000, for Coloured women at 82 per 1,000. 
Though lowering among the most recent young cohorts, early motherhood was widespread: still in 2002 
43% over the African 15-19-year olds had at least one child (and even 4% of African girls under 15). Teen-
age motherhood has a strong negative effect on high school completion. By contrast, higher education in 
particular may result in lower rates of teenage motherhood (Worku-Yergou  Belay 2007).
Marriage is not self-evident. According to the 2001 Census, 48% of the African women 20-40 of age 
with at least one child had never been married. Of those being married, about one third did so through 
traditional marriage, normally including a lobola (bride price). Polygamy exists, be it to a limited extent, the 
most prominent example being the country’s current president, Jacob Zuma. It has been analysed that better 
education increases women’s chances to be married. However, African women in South Africa would enter 
into a civil marriage only if the man is employed, reegardless of his income level – mainly because there are 
fewer eligible African men than women (Worku-Yergou Belay 2007).
Since 1994, life expectancy has fallen by almost 20 years – mainly because of the rise in HIV-related 
mortality (The Lancet 2009). For 2006, life expectancy at birth in South Africa was with 50.1 years rather 
low, though still the highest in the sub-Saharan region; the expectancy was 51.0 years for females and 49.1 
for males (UNDP 2008a). For 2009, the respective estimates have been lowered to 49.0 years – 48.1 years 
for males and 49.8 for females (CIA World Factbook). The position of the probability of not surviving to 
age 40 is about the same; for the cohort born in 2000-05 the South African percentage was 31.7%: in global 
perspective a high proportion, but the lowest among the sub-Saharan countries (UNDP 2008a). The devel-Page ● 47
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opment of these yardsticks in the near future will depend heavily on the spread –or containment—of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic.
Relevant population statistics for South Africa include those concerning race. For 2005, Statistics South 
Africa estimated the population to be 46,880,200, of which 37,205,700 (79.4%) were Black, 4,148,800 (8.8%) 
Coloured, 1,153,900 (2.5%) Indian/Asian, and 4,379,800 (9.3%) White (SSA 2005b). Between 1996-2005 
the proportion of Whites fell by 1.2%points. This decrease has often been linked to the human capital ﬂ  ight 
from South Africa in recent years: the brain drain of mainly high-skilled Whites. Not all simple assumptions 
in the complicated debate on this phenomenon prove to be true. For example, the net loss of high-educated 
South Africans was as much due to a decrease in immigration as to an increase in emigration, and begun 
long before democratization. Truth is that the health sector has been particularly hit, with 80,000 health 
workers emigrating between 1989 and 1997 (wikipedia Economy of South Africa; Butler 2005, 598).
HIV/AIDS 2.6.2. 
South African demographics are heavily inﬂ  uenced by the high incidence of the HIV and AIDS pan-
demic. In 2007, about 5.5 million South African people lived with HIV. By then the country’s HIV/AIDS 
prevalence rate for those aged 15-49 was estimated at 16.3% (16,293 per 100,000), the world’s fourth high-
est proportion (WHO 2009), though in 2004 the estimated rate of 18.8% (16.8% - 20.7%) was even higher 
(UNDP 2008b). In KwaZulu-Natal, HIV prevalence in 2006 had reached a staggering 39% (Bhana and 
Pattman 2009, 69). 
Ambitious government plans as of 1994 and 1997 to combat AIDS turned out to be vulnerable for 
obstruction by provincial health bureaucracies and lack of professional health workers. Poor relations were 
developed with the voluntary sector. By the time Mbeki entered into ofﬁ  ce, in 1999, ofﬁ  cial estimates of 
the number of HIV-positive cases stood at four million people. Despite the gravity of the crisis, Mbeki 
launched broadsides against the conventional intellectual foundations of AIDS health, suggesting that 
medical scientists and anti-AIDS activists had racial motives. Finally, under pressure of civil organisations, 
notably the TAC, in July 2002 the Constitutional Court ordered the government to provide nevirapine to all 
HIV-positive pregnant mothers at all public hospitals free of charge “without delay”; under further court 
pressure the government in the end responded with an AIDS drugs programme (Meredith 2005, 667-672; 
Butler 2005). As a group of South African researchers, medical specialists and care providers concludes, 
“Particularly in the case of HIV/AIDS, denialism and failures in leadership have led to unnecessary loss of 
life and a runaway epidemic” (The Lancet 2009). The group also points at the major inequalities remaining Page ● 48
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in health status and health service access across the country. For example, only 14% of citizens are able to 
access the private health care sector, and yet they beneﬁ  t from up to 60% of national health expenditure; 
moreover, there is a huge mismatch as 79% of all doctors are working in the private sector. The HIV preva-
lence, the group emphasizes, has contributed signiﬁ  cantly to the MDG health targets (MDG 4 and 5) going 
off track in the late 1990s.
Gender, race and sexuality obviously are key factors underlying HIV risk. New HIV infections dispro-
portionately affect young poor females and in South Africa the young and the poor are predominantly black. 
In 2008, HIV prevalence among the African population was eight times higher than among Coloureds, and 
40 times higher than among Whites and Indians/Asians (derived from HSRC 2009, 79). Intensive migration 
ﬂ  ows and bad living conditions for a number of occupational groups, like for miners, for mobile workers in 
commercial agriculture, for truck drivers and for sex workers interacting with such groups, enlarge HIV in-
fection chances for notably Africans (IOM 2007). Trade unions in these sectors, like the COSATU afﬁ  liates 
of mineworkers, communications and transport workers, but also unions of clothing and textile workers, 
teachers and retail workers are active in pushing employers and Bargaining Councils to engage in prevention, 
treatment and care concerning HIV/AIDS (NALEDI 2008, 37-44).
Among 15-24-year-olds, women account for about 90% of new HIV infections. And in 2005 HIV inci-
dence among 20-29-year-old women was approximately 5.6%, more than six times higher than for men of 
the same age (UNAIDS/WHO 2008a, 4). As various reports emphasize, in South Africa young girl’s vulner-
ability to HIV infection in the face of gender power inequalities is compounded by that they increasingly 
have older partners, not rarely are targeted by older men for sex and in general ﬁ  nd very little support and 
guidance. In daily life a great deal of emphasis is placed on men’s dominance over women and girls. Women 
and girls, in contrast, are widely expected to be passive and innocent on sexual matters (Bhana and Pattman 
2009, 69-70; HSRC 2009, 64-5). As UNAIDS/WHO (2008b) argues, girl’s subordinated status with regard 
to boys and men is a critical factor inﬂ  uencing greater risk to infection, placing gender issues at the centre of 
the HIV prevention challenge. In South Africa developing an understanding of young adults in the context 
of HIV/AIDS is complicated by that gender is racialized and expressed through social class (O’Sullivan et al 
2006). Yet, undoubtedly both because of their level of infection and because caring for sick family members 
is considered a women’s task, it is that the burden of HIV/AIDS continues to fall mainly on (black) women. 
On top of this comes the growing number of orphans. As we argued in our DECISIONS FOR LIFE 
Country Report No. 1 on Mozambique, orphanage will deﬁ  nitely ruin the prospects in life of many girls. In Page ● 49
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2000 the number of chronically poor AIDS orphans in South Africa was estimated at 371,000 (Aliber 2003); 
this may have reached the one million mark already by 2008.
Research shows the baleful combination between HIV and AIDS and tuberculosis (TB), as one of the 
main opportunist infections – but largely curable. TB indeed is a major health problem in South Africa. 
In 2005 the TB prevalence rate was 511 per 100,000 inhabitants, and 58% of the new TB cases were HIV 
positive. South Africa shows many examples that drug-resistant TB can spread rapidly in communities of 
people living with HIV, resulting in very high mortality. Moreover, it is spreading among health care workers, 
of which many women. Multi-drug resistance is becoming an increasing problem. The WHO estimates for 
2002 were that 1.8% and 6.7% of new and previously treated TB cases respectively, were multi-drug resist-
ant (UN 2005, 2006; Ryan 2007; UNAIDS/WHO 2008a). 
Actually the health authorities are committed to ﬁ  ght the pandemic. They, and the numerous activists 
in this ﬁ  eld, can feel supported by progress in that ﬁ  ght. The latest HIV data collected at antenatal clinics 
in South Africa suggest that HIV infection levels might be leveling off (UNAIDS/WHO 2008a, 3). The 
country has reached one of the world’s highest levels of HIV testing and HIV status awareness in its gen-
eral population (UNAIDS/WHO 2008b). Besides the decrease of the estimated overall adult HIV/AIDS 
prevalence rate between 2004 and 2007, as already mentioned, there has most recently been a decrease of 
HIV prevalence among the 15-24 of age, from 10.3% in 2005 to 8.6% in 2008, and the decrease among 
those aged 15-19 years seems even larger. This may well be attributable to the considerable increase in 
condom use observed among males and females aged 14 to 22, that already became visible between 1998 
and 2002 (UN 2005; Dinkelman et al 2008). In this respect, researchers (HSRC 2009, 66) have called the 
condom promotion and distribution system developed by the South African government “highly success-
ful”. Moreover, they point at an increased openness in many communities to discuss sex and condom use 
among youth, linked with the fact that young females are becoming more empowered to negotiate condom 
use than before. Peer educators in secondary schools play a major role in ‘HIV education’ (De Bruyne 2009). 
By contrast, HIV prevalence remains disproportionally high for women in the 25-29 year age group, where a 
nationwide survey in 2008 found one in three (32.7%) to be HIV positive – the same proportion as in 2002 
(HSRC 2009, 63-4).
Women’s labour market share 2.6.3. 
A large share of the South African population is 0-14 years: in 2007 31.8%, but with a clear gender 
difference: 33.8% of the male population and 29.8% of the female part. On the other hand, a rather small Page ● 50
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share of the population was 65 of age and older: 5.3% of the total population, only 4.5% of the males and 
6.2% of the females (ILO-Laborsta, EAPEP and authors’ calculations). If we leave out this last group in 
order to comply with the internationally comparable Labour Participation Rate (LPR) or Employment-to-
Population ratio (EPOP) that only takes stock of the 15-64 of age, we found for 2007 an over-all LPR or 
EPOP of 57.4%. Across countries, this EPOP is in the middle range. With 49.8%, the female LPR or EPOP 
is considerably lower than the male ﬁ  gure (64.2%) (MDG indicator 1.5). We could estimate the proportion of 
own-account and contributing family members in total employment (15-65 of age) by 2005 at 19.0% (MDG 
indicator 1.7, derived from UN MDG Indicators).
In table 4 we present more detailed ﬁ  gures, including an overview for 2000-2007. The table shows that 
according to the ofﬁ  cial statistics the LPR’s for both sexes fell in the 2000s, with respectively 2.7%points and 
3.2%points. As the table shows, between 2000-’07 all female shares fell somewhat. In 2007, women made up 
44.2% of the employed (2000: 45.1%), but 53.3% (2000: 53.6%) of the unemployed (narrow deﬁ  nition). 
Table 4  Employment status by gender, South Africa, 2000 and 2007 (aged 15-64, Sept.) 
2000 2007
males females % fem. males females % fem.
employed*), x 1,000 (a)  6,770 5,566 45.1 7,588 6,020 44.2
unemployed, x 1,000 (b) 1,738 2,004 53.6 1,693 1,931 53.3
not economically active,x 1,000 (c ) 4,210 6,720 61.4 5,181 8,001 58.9
labour force, x 1,000 (a+b) 8,508 7,570 47.2 9,281 7,951 46.1
working age, x 1,000 (a+b+c) 12,718 14,290 52.9 14,462 15,592 51.9
unemploym. rate ((b):(a+b) x 100) 20.4% 26.5% 18.2% 24.3%
absorption rate ((a):(a+b+c) x 100) 53.2% 39.0% 52.5% 37.7%
LPR/EPOP ((a+b):(a+b+c) x 100) 66.9% 53.0% 64.2% 49.8%
Source: Statistics South Africa 2009a
*) employers, employees and self-employed
In 2007, women in the (ﬁ  ve years’) age cohorts between 25 and 50 of age all showed a rather high labour 
participation (statistics not shown), with rates over 60%, though consistently lower than the male LPR’s, 
which were all over 80% for these age groups. The rates were highest for those aged 35-39, both for women 
(69.0%) and for men (87.6%). For the 15-19-year-olds, the LPR’s remained quite low: 7.7% for girls of that 
age and 11,5% for boys, while in the 20-24 age cohort about half of all was economically active: 47.1% of 
the young women of that age, against 56.1% of the young men. With 63.8% for the females and 81.2% for 
the males, the LPR’s for the 25-29-year-olds are considerably higher.18 Though information on labour mar-
18  It should be noted that in the youngest age category, and below that, child labour may prevail to a certain extent. The 1999 
SAYP survey found that, when leaving out fetching fuel and water, about 400,000 children aged 5-17 years or 3% of this age 
group worked for 12 or more hours per week (SAYP, cited in UN 2005, 19).Page ● 51
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ket streams is lacking, these ﬁ  gures are in line with other evidence showing that the South African economy 
has growing problems to create jobs for newcomers in the labour market. This is especially true for female 
adolescents (cf. DRPU 2007, 6).
Table 5 (next page) details the ﬁ  gures presented earlier by gender and race. It shows that in 2007 of the 
23.5 million Black Africans of working age, 9.6 million were employed and 3.6 million were ofﬁ  cially unem-
ployed, resulting in a LPR/EPOP of 56% -- just over 60% for African men and less than 48% for African 
women. Among women, LPR’s were highest for Coloured women (62%), followed by Whites (57%), while 
with 44% those for Indian/Asian women were by far lowest. The table allows to specify our earlier ﬁ  nding 
that the LPR’s for both sexes fell in the 2000s: this was true for three of four population groups – not for 
Coloured females and not for White males. Page ● 52
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Table 5  Employment status by gender and race, South Africa, 2000 and 2007, x 1,000 headcount 
  (aged 15-64, Sept.) 
2000 2007
males females males females
employed*), x 1,000 (a)  (6,770) (5,566) (7,588) (6,020)
Black African 4,630 3,879 5,348 4,271
Coloured 750 625 806 715
Indian / Asian 243 144 298 165
White 1,147 919 1,137 869
unemployed, x 1,000 (b) (1,738) (2,004) (1,693) (1,931)
Black African 1,447 1,682 1,378 1,647
Coloured 191 210 246 218
Indian / Asian 46 41 27 21
White 54 71 41 45
not economically active,x 1,000 (c ) (4,210) (6,720) (5,181) (8,001)
Black African 3,457 5,296 4,376 6,498
Coloured 285 528 342 574
Indian / Asian 82 187 110 239
White 386 709 353 689
labour force, x 1,000 (a+b) (8,508) (7,570) (9,281) (7,951)
Black African 6,077 5,561 6,726 5,918
Coloured 941 835 1,052 933
Indian / Asian 289 185 325 186
White 1,201 990 1,178 914
working age, x 1,000 (a+b+c) (12,718) (14,290) (14,462) (15,592)
Black African 9,534 10,857 11,102 12,415
Coloured 1,226 1,363 1,394 1,508
Indian / Asian 371 371 435 426
White 1,587 1,669 1,532 1,603
narrow unemployment rate ((b):(a+b) 
x 100) (20.4%) (26.5%) (18.2%) (24.3%)
Black African 23.8% 30.2% 20.5% 27.8%
Coloured 20.3% 25.1% 23.4% 23.4%
Indian / Asian 15.8% 22.1% 8.4% 11.3%
White 4.5% 7.2% 3.5% 4.9%
absorption rate ((a):(a+b+c) x 100) (53.2%) (39.0%) (52.5%) (37.7%)
Black African 48.6% 35.7% 48.2% 34.4%
Coloured 61.2% 45.9% 57.8% 47.4%
Indian / Asian 65.5% 38.7% 68.5% 38.8%
White 72.3% 54.1% 74.2% 54.2%
LPR/EPOP ((a+b):(a+b+c)x 100) (66.9%) (53.0%) (64.2%) (49.8%)
Black African 63.7% 51.2% 60.6% 47.7%
Coloured 76.7% 61.3% 75.5% 61.9%
Indian / Asian 77.8% 49.7% 74.7% 43.8%
White 75.7% 58.3% 76.9% 57.0%
Source: Statistics South Africa 2009a
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If we calculate absorption rates, dividing the employed (a) by those of working age (a+b+c), the out-
comes throw an even clearer light upon the dramatic labour market position of the Africans, particularly 
of African women. In 2007 only slightly over 34% of African women 15-64 of age were absorbed by the 
labour market: a fall of 1.3%points compared to their already low absorption rate of 2000. The absorp-
tion rates of women from the three other population groups went up slightly, though with 39% the rate of 
Indian/Asian women remained very low as well. The absorption rates of White males and females were by 
far highest. Now we can specify our conclusion of the former section: especially Black female adolescents 
meet large difﬁ  culties in ﬁ  nding jobs.
Table 6 shows that between 2000 and 2007, the share of women workers has slightly increased in formal 
employment, to just over 40%, and decreased in the informal sector, though with 55.5% women still form 
a clear majority of those in informal employment. In formal labour, the female shares grew in all industries 
except manufacturing, where the share fell, and community, social and personal services, where the female 
share remained the same. In informal labour, the picture is mixed, with strong increases of the female part in 
agriculture, ﬁ  shing etc. as well as in transport, storage and communication, moderate increases in construc-
tion and community and related services as well as decreases in manufacturing, ﬁ  nance and other business 
and notably in private households, while the female share remained constant in wholesale and retail trade. 
Taking formal and informal employment together, the strongest growth in female shares took place in ag-
riculture, ﬁ  shing etc – however, a decreasing sector, as well as in transport etc. and in construction – more 
meaningful as these two sectors are rapidly expanding (see Table 2).
Table 6  Female employment shares by sector and industry, South Africa, 2000 and 2007 
2000 2007
formal informal formal informal
Agriculture, ﬁ  shing etc.  34.1 48.7 41.4 63.2
Mining 2.4 18.1 7.2 -
Manufacturing 33.1 57.6 29.8 53.2
Electricity, gas, water supply 15.6 - 29.1 -
Construction 7.5 8.4 13.9 9.8
Wholesale and retail trade 45.1 59.2 47.4 59.2
Transport, storage, communication 17.2 4.8 23.6 12.1
Finance, insurance, other business 35.0 38.8 42.1 36.0
Community, social, personal serv. 57.8 59.5 57.8 62.4
Private households - 83.5 - 74.5
Total 38.1 58.4 40.1 55.5
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As for (categories of) occupations, Table 7 (next page) indicates between 2000-2009 a considerable 
growth in the numbers of women as well as the female share in some higher and middle categories, notably 
among managers (and legislators and senior ofﬁ  cials); professionals; clerks, and to a lesser extent also among 
craft and related trades workers, and among plant and machine operators. After a period of rapid growth, 
in 2007-2009 the female share of professionals decreased abruptedly, but here statistical anomalies may 
play a role (The 2009 ﬁ  gures are anyway somewhat less reliable). Between 1995-2005 women with degrees 
experienced the highest increase in labour force participation, followed by women with completed second-
ary education (a matric qualiﬁ  cation) and then those with completed General Education and Training (GET 
-- DRPU 2007, 3). Focusing at top levels, according to a 2004 worldwide research project, concerning CEOs 
and board chairs the South African female share was with 7.1% much lower than the female share in the 
category managers at large. So was, with 14.7%, the country’s female share of executive managers (Mathur-
Helm 2005, 60). 
Table  7 Numbers of females employed *)(headcount, x 1,000) and female employment shares by 
  occupation, South Africa, 2000 (Sept.), 2007 (Sept.), 2009 (Apr.-June)
2000 2007 2009
x 1,000 % x 1,000 % x 1,000 %
Managers 169 25.3 323 31.1 325 31.8
Professionals 182 44.6 341 53.3 296 45.3
Technicians 772 55.2 820 54.7 824 53.2
Clerks 775 66.0 947 69.5 1,019 70.8
Sales and services workers 797 48.2 796 45.5 895 49.6
Skilled agricultural workers 138 37.8 50 46.7 17 20.5
Craft and related trades workers 279 16.1 345 17.4 239 13.4
Plant and machine operators 193 15.2 201 16.4 180 15.2
Elementary occupations 1,276 48.4 1,271 42.4 1,247 43.2
Domestic workers 985 96.1 927 92.4 931 96.7
Total 5,566 45.1 6,020 44.2 5,973 44.4
Source: 2000 and 2007: Statistics South Africa 2009a: 2009: 2009b
*) employers, employees and self-employed
Table 7 also shows that, though the number of female technicians (in full: technical and associate pro-
fessionals, like teachers and nurses) grew, their share fell by 2%points. Both the number of female service 
and sales workers and their share grew recently, be it obviously in ﬁ  nance and other businesses and not in 
trade (see sections 2.6.6 and 2.6.7). The number of female skilled agricultural workers fell strongly, and 
recently their share decreased as well. Between 2000 and 2007, the numbers of women in elementary oc-
cupations fell both absolutely and relatively, whereas in 2007-’09 the number of men fell stronger. In line 
with Table 6, domestic workers initially showed the same trend, but quite recently the female number and Page ● 55
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the female share grew. Besides domestic workers, in 2009 the share of informal labour was highest in skilled 
agricultural jobs (58%), elementary jobs (48%), craft and related trades (40%), and sales and services jobs 
(35%), and lowest among technicians (9%) and among professionals and clerks (both 8%)(SSA 2009b; a 
gender division is lacking).
We are now able to calculate the LPR for the target group of DECISIONS FOR LIFE, the girls and 
young women aged 15-29, for early 2009 on roughly 2.9 million economically active on a female population 
of 7.0 million (41%). Of these 2.9 million, 1.9 million may have been in formal employment and 1.0 million 
in informal employment (partly based on SSA 2009b, Table 3.6). As for educational level of the employed 
in the target group the latest available data is from in 2001. By then, 39% of the economically active females 
aged 15-29 (by the time nearly 2.5 million) had an educational level at ISCED levels 0, 1 and 2; 50% at 
levels 3 and 4, and 11% at levels 5 and 6 (based on ILO-Laborsta). We may assume that in 2009 two-thirds 
of the 2.9 million girls and young women, thus 1.9 million, are at least employed at ISCED 3 level. Finally 
we estimate, also based on our Tables 2 and 3, that of the 2.9 million girls and young women 15-29 of age 
in employment, recently about 1.4 million is working in urban areas in commercial services (commerce i.e. 
wholesale and retail trade, and ﬁ  nance and other business services, like tourism). It may be expected that 
in the next ﬁ  ve years 300,000 to 500,000 (depending on the economic conditions) more girls and young 
women will enter into employment, of which about half in commercial services.
Below, we shortly describe developments in large industries with special attention to the position of 
women.
Agriculture 2.6.4. 
Unlike in other sub-Saharan countries, subsistence and small-scale farming is not dominant in South 
Africa, but large commercial enterprises are. If we include the various forms of agriculture, the employment 
share of agriculture has decreased to about 8% in 2007, by far the lowest ﬁ  gure on the African continent. 
With 7%, agriculture’s contribution to female employment was even lower (our calculations, based on ILO-
Laborsta). In early 2009, agriculture contributed only 2.8% to the country’s GDP (SSA 2009c). The Land 
Act of 1913 ﬁ  nally resulted in 90% of the arable land being owned by white farmers by 1994. Land redis-
tribution, aiming to have handed over 20% of that land to black farmers by 2014, until now shipwrecked 
because of lack of agricultural attitudes and knowledge in the black community and lack of government 
support (Vermaas 2009). It can be questioned anyway whether such redistribution can serve as a viable strat-
egy for employment creation (Aliber 2003, 486). This all implies that in South Africa young women living Page ● 56
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in cities and trying to make a career there, rarily can rely on a ‘fall-back scenario’ in which they are able to 
(temporarily) go back to their families living from agriculture.
Mining and manufacturing 2.6.5. 
Mining and manufacturing are intertwined in South Africa. South African manufacturing originated in 
the 1930s. It rests rather heavily on value-added processing of the country’s rich mineral resources; today 
South Africa is the world’s largest producer of platinum and chromium and the third largest producer of 
gold, though its world market position is weakening, investments have been postponed and the 2008-’09 
crisis has heavily hit mining (Vermaas and Depuydt 2009). In the early 2000s, manufacturing companies 
successfully diversiﬁ  ed into motor vehicles and parts, high value-added textiles, foodstuff, etcetera (DTI 
2008). Under the GEAR program, a capital-intensive growth pattern became visible, leading to massive job-
shedding in large companies (Carmody 2002, 269-271). 
Reports from as varying sources as the World Bank and the trade unions have documented the trend 
towards outsourcing and casualisation of work in manufacturing, notably in metals and engineering, with 
nearly 30% of manufacturing employment still the largest sub-sector. In this sub-sector, between 1999 and 
2002 the share of casual, temporary and sub-contracted labour increased from 3 to 10% of formal employ-
ment (ALRN 2004, 18; also: Rama in internal World Bank report, cited in Hoogeveen and Özler 2005, 4). 
Much casual work may have been moved to the informal sector, and it may well be that currently many 
women in informal employment, like in homework, are dependent on the manufacturing sector (cf. Orr 
2003). Since 2000, manufacturing became a less promising source of employment for women. The inﬂ  ux 
of women, also African women, witnessed especially since the fall of apartheid (Bhorat 2000, 445), came 
to a standstill while overall formal employment grew. In 2005, the manufacturing workforce was made up of 
61% Africans (men 39%, women 22%), Coloureds 15%, Indians/Asians 7%, and Whites 17% (SSA 2005b). 
From 2000 to 2009, the industry’s male employment share increased from 63 to 67%. Yet, already in 2007 
the absolute growth in male employment came to a halt, and male employment fell in two years’ time by 
7%, to 1,252,000 employed in April - June 2009. In the crisis women’s manufacturing employment decreased 
somewhat less rapidly, by 5% to 621,000 employed in April – June 2009 (SSA 2009b). 
Commerce 2.6.6. 
As said, between 1970-2007 commerce (wholesale and retail trade) was the largest grower in South 
African employment. However, the years 2007-’09 saw a serious fall in employment, of 13% to 2,962,000 Page ● 57
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employed in April – June 2009: 1,473,000 women (implying a decrease of 16% in two years’ time) and 
1,489,000 men (minus 10% -- SSA 2009b). Commerce has for a long time been an important source of em-
ployment for the African population, women and men alike. In 2005, Black Africans made up 71% of both 
the formal and the informal commerce workforce (men 34%, women 37%), Coloureds 9%, Indians/Asians 
5%, and Whites 15%. By that year, 682,000 of the just over one million African women working in the sec-
tor did so in informal labour; they made up over 55% of the informal workforce in commerce (SSA 2005b). 
Though ﬁ  gures remain scarce, various informations indicate that the recent fall in commerce employment 
hits the African population seriously.
In the 1990s practices of casualisation and externationalisation of labour accelerated in the retail sector, 
so that much formal employment changed into quasi-formal work. Fluctuations in demand were growingly 
covered through casual workers working irregular hours. Externationalisation took the form of contracting 
out non-core services like cleaning and security, and outsourcing shelf-stacking via labour brokers. In 2003, 
COSATU-afﬁ  liated union SACCAWU organised a company-wide strike against managerial ﬂ  exibility and 
casualisation practices at the Shoprite supermarket chain: a successful story of workers’ mobilisation (Von 
Holdt and Webster 2008, 342-3). Wholesale and retail is one of the few sectors with non-statutory wage 
bargaining at decentralised level. SACCAWU bargains with national chains, medium-sized and small ﬁ  rms. 
By exception, bargaining has been decentralised to individual stores of a retail chain (Bhorat et al 2009a, 19). 
As we will show in section 2.8.1, the current average earnings level in the wholesale and retail industry at 
large, thus including repair activities and hotels and restaurants, is comparatively low.
The food retail sector continuously suffers from the country’s huge income differences. The new black 
middle class coming up in the 2000s clearly spent their extra disposable income on non-durable items and 
hardly on food. Nevertheless, large food chains like Shoprite, Pick ‘n Pay and Spar South Africa try to make 
inroads in the informal market, catering for the mass of township dwellers, actually served by street vendors, 
shebeens, tuck shops and spaza shops (Kuipers 2005). In terms of employment, this may merely imply a 
shift to (quasi)formal labour, but maybe also an improvement in job quality.
The government’s 2005 ASGI-SA program identiﬁ  ed two sub-sectors demanding special priority atten-
tion: the call centre industry and tourism. In general they seem to live up to the expectations and to fulﬁ  ll 
their potential. As about 60% of South African call centres are linked with commercial services (Benner et 
al 2007), we will treat their perspectives in the next section. Tourist accomodation, and notably hotels and 
restaurants, is statistically covered by wholesale and retail, so we will treat tourism here. The rapid growth 
of tourism in 2004-’07 ended in the second half of 2008, and 2009 is expected to remain a slack year, with Page ● 58
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3% growth on a GDP basis, followed by a recovery in 2010, when South Africa will organise the FIFA 
World Cup tournament. For 2009 the total number of jobs related to tourism in South Africa is calculated 
at 1,052,000, or nearly 8% of total employment. The World Travel and Tourism Council expects the long-
term growth of tourism to South Africa to be an average 8.5% yearly over the coming ten years (WTTC 
website). If we limit ourselves to the 2010-2012 period, this prediction may imply the creation of 180,000 
to 220,000 new jobs.
Services 2.6.7. 
Business services other than commerce are booming in South Africa. As said, from 1970-2000 percent-
wise employment in ﬁ  nance, insurance and other business grew even quicker than retail and wholesale 
trade – again, for men and women alike—as well as continued to grow in 2007-’09, by 18% to 1,710,000 
employed in April – June 2009: 781,000 women (plus 29%!) and 929,000 men (plus 10%), bringing women’s 
share to a record 46% (SSA 2009b). In 2005, Black Africans made up 49% of the ﬁ  nance and other busi-
ness workforce (men 32%, women 17%), Coloureds 10%, Indians/Asians 4%, and Whites 36% (men and 
women both 18%) (SSA 2005b). 
In 2004-‘05, there were already about 1,200 call centres in operation in South Africa, with nearly 100,000 
employees, and ASGI-SA expected that another 100,000 jobs could be created between 2005-2009. In 2004-
’05 about three-thirds of the workforce of the centres was female, and 88% of all call centre agents worked 
full-time. Obviously employers in this new industry try to keep unions and collective bargaining out; of the 
2004 sample researched, only 23% was covered by collective bargaining, and for agents the collective bar-
gaining wage premium was only 4% (Benner et al 2007). Various sources suggest a further growth in South 
African call centre employment of 100,000 agent positions (seats) between 2007-’12. Yet, it has to be noted 
that this expansion will partly ‘cannibalize’ on other jobs in ﬁ  nance, other commercial services but also in 
the public service, and that it will partly represent autonomous growth. 
Government 2.6.8. 
Between 1994 and 1996 government policy focused on ending racial discrimination and creating a sin-
gle, uniﬁ  ed public service for the country. 1996-1999 marked the second phase of transformation but rather 
than expand the public service, government put into practice the prescriptions of GEAR, leading to cuts in 
personnel expenditure, the outsourcing and privatization of services, and wage increases for public servants 
not fully covering rising consumer prices. From 2001 on, policies were marked by a degree of emphasis on Page ● 59
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the need to strengthen the state and build capacity to deliver services, but in the course of the 2000s budget-
ary constraints became more pressing and employment growth for public servants remained below 5% in 
total. Especially in municipal services, shop ﬂ  oor workers recently are said to feel frustrated because of the 
high salaries of top ofﬁ  cials. The distance between highest and lowest wages in public service is suggested 
to have grown from 20 : 1 in 1996 to 30 : 1 in 2006 (Ndungu 2008). 
Throughout the 2000s, the public sector employed about 70% of those in community, social and per-
sonal services: the industry distinguished in the employment statistics. In 2005, the public sector employed 
about equal numbers of men and women (Bosch 2006). In that year, Black Africans made up 65% of the 
total community, social and personal services workforce (men 31%, women 34%), Coloureds 11%, Indi-
ans/Asians 3%, and Whites 21% (men 8% and women both 13%) (SSA 2005b). Also in 2005, the median 
monthly wages of the public sector employees within this industry were higher than the wages of those 
working in the private sector at large. Analyses of 2005 data learned that public-sector workers earned over 
30% more than private-sector workers after controlling for other characteristics; this wage premium was 
34% for women and 33% for men. The outcomes indicated that females earned less than their male coun-
terparts in both the public and the private sector, after controlling for other characteristics. Yet, the results 
also showed that the public sector has moved faster to ensure wage equity in terms of gender and popula-
tion group than the private sector (Bosch 2006, 20-4).
Education and skill levels of the female labour force 2.7. 
Literacy 2.7.1. 
As such, literacy does not seem a core problem, neither for South Africa as a nation nor for South African 
women and girls. The adult literacy rate in 1999-2006 was, according to UNDP (2008), nearly 88%, by far 
the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, this rate still implies that about 4.2 million adult South Afri-
cans, of which about 95% Black women and men, are not functionally literate, meaning that they can neither 
read nor write. Other than in elsewhere in the region, the gender gap is small or non-existent in literacy. In 
1999-2006 the overall male literacy rate was 88.5%, against 86.7% overall for women, or 98% women to men 
parity. However, women aged 15-24 years fared even better than their male counterparts in terms of literacy. 
In 2007, the literacy rate for 15-24 year-olds was overall 95.4%: 94.6% for men and 96.3% for women, so Page ● 60
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with nearly 102% women to men parity (MDG Indicator 2.3, derived from UN MDG Indicators and based 
on UNESCO data).
Education of girls
Combined gross enrollment in South African education was in 2005 overall 77.0%, with exactly the same 
ﬁ  gure for both sexes: again, clearly the highest ﬁ  gure in the sub-Saharan region (UNDP 2008b).
For 2007, net enrollment in primary education (NER) was set at 91.0%, an increase compared to the 87% 
of 2005 (UNDP 2008b). The 2007 rate was divided as follows: boys 90.0%, girls 92.0%. Girls’ enrollment 
remained higher than boys’, with 102% women to men parity (MDG indicator 2.1, derived from UN MDG 
Indicators). According to the latest UN MDG statistics,19 in the 2000s primary school enrollment of girls 
was consistently higher than boys’. However, the same source shows from 2000 a disquieting decrease of 
about 5%points in both enrollment ratios; 2000 marked the high point in enrollment, with 95.2% for boys 
and 96.8% for girls. The country’s young women recently attained higher levels of education than the young 
men. Of those aged 15-25 who had not completed primary school (Grade 7), in 2004 women were only 39%, 
and of those with Grade 8 in this age group, 52% were women (SSA LFS, cited in UN 2005, 23). Since 1996, 
school attendance is compulsory for all children aged 7-15 years. Though attendance after 1994 increased 
considerably, the 2003 General Household Survey still counted about 5% of eligible children aged 7-15 years 
not attending primary school. Reasons for school non-attendance related to affordability, illness and far dis-
tances to the nearest school (UN 2005, 4, 19). In recent years non-attendance rates may have gone up, in line 
with lower enrollment.
For 2005, the gross enrollment in secondary education could be estimated at 87%, about 7%-points high-
er than in 1994, though the net enrollment rate stuck at 62%. Already in the 1990s surveys already showed 
a higher female enrollment ratio, and this continued in the 2000s, ending up in 2007 with an overall rate of 
87%, divided in respectively 85% for young men and 89% for young women – implying 101% women to men 
parity (MDG indicator 2.1, derived from UN MDG Indicators and UN Data). 
For 2005, the gross enrollment rate for tertiary education (number of students as a percentage of the 
ﬁ  ve-year age group following on from the secondary school leaving age) was set at 15.5%: 17% for young 
women and just below 14% for young men (UNDP 2008b). Already by 1996, women outnumbered men in 
the universities, though the opposite pattern still held in the so-called technikons, now part of the universi-
ties. Yet, in 2003 49% of those enrolled at technikons were female, while 56% of all university students were 
19   Not according to earlier UN statistics (cf. UN 2005, 21).Page ● 61
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female (UN 2005, 21). And though in 1996 for tertiairy education the women to men parity was still 92%, 
the 2001 gave an outcome of 115 women to 100 men, whereas the 2005 outcomes indicate 122 women on 
each 100 men.
All these ﬁ  gures have to be projected against the backdrop of the extremely inequitable and racist edu-
cational system the African and, to somewhat lesser extent, the Coloured and Asians/Indian population 
had to suffer from under the apartheid regime. For example, in the 1980s teacher : pupil ratios in primary 
schools averaged 1:18 in white schools, 1;24 in Asian schools, 1:27 in coloured schools and 1:39 in black 
schools. Whereas 96% of all teachers in white schools had teaching certiﬁ  cates, only 15% of black teachers 
were certiﬁ  ed (wikipedia). After 1994, the ANC government has invested heavily in education, continuously 
spending about 20% of the budget. Schools have become less overcrowded and the physical infrastructure 
has improved. However, as the UN (2005) notes, the country continues to have a differentiated public 
schooling system with poor learning conditions especially in the poorer, rural areas. The South African 
Schools Act (SASA, 1996) provides for two types of schools, public and independent, and many have criti-
cized the two-tier, allegedly largely racial, secondary education system (cf. Brookes and Hinks 2004, 577-2).
More recently, broad efforts are going on to improve the quality of learning at schools and to diminish 
dropout rates. In particular two programs may be instrumental here, targeting education for the poorest 
through fee-free schools, fully funded by the state, and the National Schools Nutrition Program. In 1999, 
the parliament adopted the NQF Framework. The key objective of the NQF was to create a seamless and 
integrated education system which would encompass learning outcomes from formal, informal and voca-
tional sectors including the early childhood development (ECD), general education and training (GET), 
further education and training (FET) and higher education (HE) (website South Africa info). 
Female skill levels 2.7.2. 
Since the end of apartheid, skill levels in the South African labour market have been remarkably up-
graded. This is especially true for women. In 1995, less than 21% of the labour force had at least completed 
secondary educated education (Dias 2006), whereas in April-June 2009 this proportion was 45%: in formal 
employment 59% and in informal employment 21% (SSA 2009b). Table 8 (next page) presents for April – 
June 2009 an overview of the economically active (divided in employed and unemployed) and the economi-
cally not active by highest level of education20, concerning the employed and unemployment also by gender. 
These ﬁ  gures show that the South African employed women have, roughly spoken, closed the educational 
20  Note that these levels indicate the educational/skill levels of the workforce, not the skills demanded in the workplace. Statistics 
South Africa does not produce statistics concerning the latter.Page ● 62
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gap with men – and even more than that. Whereas in 2009 50% of the female employed had completed 
secondary or tertiary education, the equivalent male share got stuck at 45.5%. Nearly 21% of the employed 
South African women had completed their tertiairy education, 4.2%points more than the men.21 
Table 8 also shows that the gap in education between employed and unemployed in South Africa is not 
that wide, though the conclusion of Dias (2006) for 2003, that there was hardly any gap in education left, 
seems somewhat exaggerated. Compared to the employed, the unemployed show an overrepresentation of 
those with non-completed secondary education and an underrepresentation of tertiary educated, both for 
women and men. Clearly, in the South African labour market completion of tertiary education enlarges job 
opportunities and diminished the risks of unemployment greatly. Non-completion of secondary education 
works the other way around. Especially among the female unemployed there seems no overrepresentation 
of low-educated, though retreat from the labour market in case of unemployment may play a role here. The 
major educational gap is the gap between the economically active, including the unemployed, and the eco-
nomically not active (though for the latter we cannot specify differences by gender). While over 80% of the 
economically not active has less than completed secondary education, this share is 54% for the economically 
active. With 2.5%, the reservoir of tertiary educated among the economically inactive is rather small.
Table 8 Highest level of education of employed and unemployed (narrow deﬁ  nition), by gender, and not
   economically not active, South Africa, 2009 (aged 15-64, April-June) 
economically active economically 
not active total males female
empl. unempl. empl. unempl.
no schooling 3.3 3.4 2.4 3.9 2.1 6.7
less than primary completed 9.4 10.0 11.5 8.7 7.0 14.1
primary completed 5.2 5.5 5.6 4.9 4.2 7.9
secondary not completed 36.1 34.5 45.0 31.9 45.4 52.6
secondary completed 29.8 28.9 30.7 29.1 34.3 15.5
tertiary 15.3 16.6 4.2 20.8 6.1 2.5
other 0.9 1.1 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
x 1,000 17,494 7,397 2,060 5,973 2,065 13,585
Source: authors’ calculations, based on SSA 2009b and on Labour Force Survey data put at the disposal of  AIAS by 
Statistics South Africa
other  = ‘don’t’ know’, unspeciﬁ  ed
21 The  ﬁ  gures conﬁ  rm the huge distance between the educational levels of the South African labour force, notably the females, 
and those of the economically active in the other sub-Saharan countries. For example, compare the nearly 21% of South 
African women with tertiairy education (admittedly, in 2009) with the very low shares of highly skilled women in the female 
labour forces of Mozambique (0.5% in 2003) and Angola (0.9% in 2002-’03) calculated in the respective DECISIONS FOR 
LIFE country reports.Page ● 63
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We have to add that Table 8 hides large differences in educational level attained across population 
groups. Our calculations based on Labour Force Survey 2005 data (SSA 2005b), differentiating across Afri-
can and other workers (not shown), learn that the share of tertiary educated African women in employment 
was less than half that of such educated employed women from the other three population groups; the 
share of highly educated African men was even one-third of their male share in the other groups.22 Remark-
able is the higher educational level on average attained by African women compared to African men. By 
2005 this was the case among the employed as well as the unemployed. While 14% of the employed African 
women had attained tertiary education, 9.5% of the employed African men had. By contrast, a considerable 
share of employed African women without any schooling remained (9%, against 7% males). The shares 
of tertiary educated among all unemployed African women and men were less than 3% for both, another 
indication that in the 2000s attaining tertiary education enlarged job opportunities for Blacks considerably. 
Again, non-completion of secondary education works the other way around; in 2005 this was about equally 
so for Blacks and for the other population groups. 
Wages and working conditions of the target group 2.8. 
Wages 2.8.1. 
Tracing wages and wage inequality in South Africa over time is frustrated by a range of statistical 
problems. Nevertheless, the use of all available sources reveals that between at least 1995 and 1998 –and, 
according to some, between 1995 and 2001—overall real average earnings decreased and the distribution of 
earnings became more unequal. The same happened with wages and the wage distribution. The decrease of 
average wages worked out quite negatively for large parts of our target group. First, the young, aged 18-30, 
were disproportionaly hit, men and women alike, though the decline was largest for women. Second, the 
(extra) income to be derived from (better) education remained absent for Africans. The returns to education 
fell dramatically for Black men and women aged 18-25, while by contrast young Whites saw pronounced 
increases in their return to education. Until 2000, the fact that many young Blacks obtained higher levels of 
education did not show up in the distribution of individual incomes. It has been suggested that the ‘jump’ 
in education for them was not large enough to pay out, while Coloureds, of which population group most 
students complete secondary education, experienced a real earnings growth in the 1990s (Casale 2004, 11; 
22  The detailed division according to highest level of education used in the LFS 2005 does not easily translate to the division used 
in Table 8.Page ● 64
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Hoogeveen and Özler 2005, 13; Leibbrandt et al 2005, 35). After the turn of the century developments were 
less clear. In section 2.3 we discussed the outcomes of Dias (2006), suggesting that in the early 2000s a 
higher level of education, in particular a matric qualiﬁ  cation, did not enhance the chances of ﬁ  nding work, 
as a perceived deterioration in the quality of the matric rendered this type of education less useful to em-
ployers in judging the future productivity of a worker. Normally this should have had negative effects on 
the entry-level wages of skilled workers, but statistical evidence is still lacking here.
As to give an overall picture of the earnings distribution, Table 9 shows median monthly earnings by 
gender, race (Africans and Whites) and occupational group. The ﬁ  gures date from 2001 but they are quite 
telling, and basically the picture has not changed in the course of the 2000s. If we compare these ﬁ  gures 
to the 2000 upper-bound poverty line, earnings turn out to be 1.6 times (African females in elementary oc-
cupations) till nearly 20 times (white male managers, legislators, and senior ofﬁ  cials) as much as the level of 
that line. Earnings inequalities are clearly very large, also within occupations -- even if we include the widely 
varying job levels, like senior – junior differences, within occupations. In 2001, African women especially 
had high earnings inequality ratios, up to 4.7 in elementary occupations and 4.9 in craft and related trades 
workers. Between occupations earnings differences were largest among African females, with a 5.5 inequal-
ity ratio, followed by African men (5.2), White males (3.2) and White females (3.1). 
The differences seem to follow closely on the skill levels required and supplied in a highly segmented 
labour market: tight demand for high-skilled white males and to a lesser extent females, versus an abundant 
supply of low-skilled African males and females. Schussler (cited in NALEDI 2008, 31) has argued that the 
huge disparities follow the law of supply and demand, and can be attributed to what he calls the country’s 
‘skills crisis’-- to put it simply: not enough high-skilled, too many low-skilled. Yet, the negative roles of 
racial and gender discrimination cannot be left aside. Analyses on the same kind of data for 2005 showed 
that wage inequality was more prominent by gender and race than by industry, occupation and education 
(Hlekiso and Mahlo 2006). Other analyses on 2005 wage data conﬁ  rmed that (higher) education in South 
Africa plays a very important role in determining wages. Speciﬁ  c educational levels of importance were a 
vocational education, a degree and a postgraduate degree. In both the public and private sector, having a vo-
cational qualiﬁ  cation contributed more towards wages than having a diploma with and/or without a matric 
certiﬁ  cate. Interestingly, it was found that a vocational qualiﬁ  cation is more important for higher wages for 
females than for their male counterparts (Bosch 2006; also: Bhorat et al 2009a).Page ● 65
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Table 9  Median real monthly earnings of employees (in Rands of 2000) by race, gender and occupation,  
  South Africa, 2001 (rounded at R 20)
Africans Whites
female male female male
Managers, legislators, senior ofﬁ  cials  5,200  6,600 7,360 11,180
Professionals  5,540 6,100 7,200 12,840
Technical and associate professionals 3,500 3,560 4,960 7,300
Clerks 2,080 2,580 4,120 5,020
Service workers, shop & market sales workers  1,120 1,880 2,460 4,680
Skilled agricultural and ﬁ  shery workers  500 740 - -
Craft and related trades workers 1,100 1,560 3,740 5,440
Plant and machine operators & assemblers 1,180 1,680 2,680 4,040
Elementary occupations 1,000 1,280 2,380 4,680
Source: Casale 2004, 17 (based on LFS 2001)
According to wage trends covering 2001-‘09, these ﬁ  gures essentially still reﬂ  ect the positions of the vari-
ous categories. Between 1998 (or 2001) and 2005 most of the wage trends described above were reversed, 
especially as the share of very low-paid (earning less than R400 per month) in 1998-2005 decreased from 
14 to 8.5%, while that of those earning R400-R1,200 per month increased from 22 to 31%. The real earn-
ings of unskilled and semi-skilled workers were slightly lower in 2005 than in 1995, whereas skilled earnings 
increased substantially over the same period (Burger and Yu 2006). The same happened between 2001 and 
2005, especially because workers with a completed postgraduate degree acquired a larger wage advantage 
(higher wage premium) in the labour market (Hlekiso and Mahlo 2006). Important to note is that between 
1995-2005 real earnings increased most for women with degrees, and that this happened across all races. 
The positive effect of education on earnings grew over time, though returns to education remained sig-
niﬁ  cantly smaller for women than for men. This happened within each race group and at every level of 
education (Casale 2004; DRPU 2007). Yet, the various trends translated into growing earnings differences 
between population groups; against that backdrop, Table 9 may even show a too positive picture. In 2005 
the real mean earnings of white males were 4.8 times those of African men and 3.0 times the mean earnings 
of all males, against respectively 4.7 and 2.7 in 1995. In 2005 the real mean earnings of white females were 
3.1 times those of African females and 2.2 times the total mean earnings of females, against 2.6 and 1.9 in 
1995 (derived from NALEDI 2008, 29). The gap between White and African women was particularly large 
in semi- and lower-skilled occupations (DRPU 2007, 8). 
Gender wage disparities also remain quite large in South Africa. Women experienced a sharper fall in 
their earnings between 1995 and 1998, so that by 2005 average female earnings were still slightly below 
their 1995 level. Observations on trends in the gender pay gap vary. Hlekiso and Mahlo (2006) found that Page ● 66
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between 2001-’05 gender inequality persisted and the difference between male and female wages even grew, 
from 31 to 38%. Based on Statistics South Africa data on average wages, Burger and Yu (2006) observed 
that the gender pay gap increased over 1995-2005, though since 2000 the gap has narrowed. By contrast, calcu-
lations of real mean earnings based on Department of Labour (DOL) data suggest that the gender pay gap has 
fallen from 41% in 1995 to 25% in 2005. In 1995, the gap between the real mean earnings of White males and 
White females was with 136% immense, while ten years later this gap was reduced to 45%. At the same time, 
the gap between earnings of African men and African women decreased from 23 to 15%, the gap between 
earnings of Coloured men and Coloured women decreased from 23 to 21%, and the gap between earnings of 
Indian/Asian men and Indian/Asian women fell from 41 to 37% (derived from Ndungu 2008, 3). 
Based on WageIndicator data, for 2007-08 the average gender pay gap in South Africa was calculated at 
33.5%, an outcome ﬁ  tting in with the aforementioned results (ITUC 2009b).23 The WageIndicator data for 
South Africa shows larger gender pay gaps for the youngest category of workers and again for the oldest 
category, both on average 39%. The gender pay gap was also larger in the private sector (average 35%) than 
in the public sector (27%). Across broad industry categories, the largest gender pay gaps were those in agri-
culture, manufacturing and building (average 36%), followed by commercial services (35%), and public sec-
tor, health care and education (31%), while with an average of 24% trade, transport and hospitality showed 
the lowest --albeit considerable—gap. Finally, the gender pay gap proved to be on average 9%points smaller 
for those covered by a collective agreement than for those who were not (ITUC 2009b, 19, 23, 28, 31). 
Contrary to the wage premium found for organised African male workers in the 1990s, no such wage 
premium could be discerned for organised African female workers, at least not for 2003. In other words, for 
them the gender pay gap was larger in the union sector than in the non-union sector. An explanation for 
this outcome may well be that African women in unionized jobs are crowded into particular occupational 
categories, and within these categories, into a narrow range of jobs. In 2003, almost half of all unionized 
women were employed as high-skilled (associate) professionals (of which 86% teachers or nurses), in con-
trast to only 10% of unionized men. And unions in South Africa try, like elsewhere, to compress the wage 
distribution among their members, by securing higher premiums for less-skilled members (Casale and Posel 
2008). Another surprising ﬁ  nding was that part-time workers earned per hour considerably more than full-
timers. In 2003, controlled for individual and job characteristics and working conditions, this hourly wage 
premium to working part-time was calculated on 34 to 40%; the premium for female part-timers was with 33 
23  Another striking result: South Africa was the country with the highest shares of workers, both males and females, that were 
unhappy with their wages; for males the score was 58% dissatisﬁ  ed, for females 63% (ITUC 2009b, 14).Page ● 67
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to 40% about the same. These results suggest a ‘wage ﬂ  oor’ in part-time employment, below which wages 
cannot drop. It is likely that the higher hourly minimum wages for those working less than 28 hours a week 
(section 2.5.1) play a role here (Posel and Muller 2008, 476).24
To end this wage section, we present in Table 10 (next page) an overview of recent average gross 
monthly earnings by industry, in 2009 Rands and in Rands of 2000. The ﬁ  gures only relate to the formal 
economy. Both columns show that two industries, construction and wholesale and retail trade, pay by far 
the lowest average wages. If the total average earnings are indexed 100, then both industries’ earnings are 68 
(current prices) or 69 (2000 prices). With an index of 89, earnings in manufacturing are also clearly below 
average. At the other end of the spectrum, working in utilities is by far best paid, with an index of 203 in 
both columns. Comparatively well paid are also workers in transport, storage and communication (129 if 
total average = 100), as well as community and other services (117 respectively 121). By international com-
parison, with an index of 114 earnings in ﬁ  nance, insurance and other business services are rather modest. 
Obviously, there is no widespread ‘bonuses culture’ in South Africa. With 8.3%, the share of bonuses and 
overtime payments is largest in earnings in transport etc., followed by utilities (6.3%) and manufacturing 
(6.2%). The lowest-paying industries also showed rather low shares of bonuses and overtime payments: 
4.6% in construction and 3.5% in wholesale and retail. Yet, with 3.2% this share remained also remarkably 
low in the ﬁ  nance sector; a year earlier it was 2.7% (authors’ calculations, based on SSA 2009d).
Table 10 Average gross monthly earnings of employees in formal sector(in current prices and at constant 
  2000 prices), including bonuses and overtime by industry, South Africa, February 2009 
  (rounded at R 20)





Wholesale and retail trade 6,560 3,960
Transport, storage, communication 12,380 7,460
Finance, insurance, other business services 10,920 6,580
Community, social, personal services 11,140 6,700
Total formal (excl. agriculture) 9,600 5,780
Source: SSA 2009d
24  According to ofﬁ  cial statistics the incidence of part-time work is rather limited in South Africa. In April–June 2009, 23% of 
the employed women and 10% of the employed men worked less than 40 hours per week (SSA 2009b).Page ● 68
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Working conditions 2.8.2. 
Attention to working conditions, and notably to occupational health and safety, gained momentum in 
South Africa with the new legislation of the 1990s. This was especially true for the industry with the most 
dramatic working conditions, i.e. mining, where the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) played a major 
role in the coming into being of the Mine Health and Safety Act. However, under the GEAR strategy health 
and safety enforcement agencies were weakened, resulting in poor compliance with legislation, particularly 
in the non-mining industries. Statistics on occupational accidents and diseases are outdated; events as such 
are generally underreported (Ryan 2007). According to both South African experts and statistics, the most 
pressing occupational health and safety problems include: 1. tuberculosis, particularly resistant TB among 
health care workers and among miners and other silica-exposed workers; 2. injuries among miners; 3. falls 
and transport accidents among construction and agricultural workers; 4. ergonomic problems (Ryan 2007, 
33; NALEDI 2008, 19-22).
A speciﬁ  c working conditions issue is that of working hours. Ofﬁ  cial statistics indicate a wide incidence 
in South Africa of very long working weeks. In April–June 2009, 25% of all employed women and 35% of 
the employed men worked more than 45 hours per week. Though the crisis has a clear inﬂ  uence in shorten-
ing long working weeks, in one year by about 4%-points for men and women alike (in April-June 2008, 29% 
of women and 39% of men weekly worked over 45 hours -- SSA 2009b), extremely long hours continue to 
demand trade union attention.
Indications of employers’ HR practices 2.8.3. 
Undoubtedly, the major challenge in the Human Resource (HR) policies of South African companies 
and civil service bodies is the need to overcome the apartheid legacy and to move from discriminatory prac-
tices, including the strategic underpinning of employment equity, fair pay and skills development (Horwitz 
et al 2002). Some early accounts hardly ﬁ  nd any progress in this ﬁ  eld, and state that in the ﬁ  rst few years 
afﬁ  rmative action measures have had hardly or no real effects, deﬁ  nitely for Black women (Brookes and 
Hinks 2004; Mathur-Helm 2005). Studies argue that in South Africa afﬁ  rmative action has been primarily 
used to readdress racial inconsistency in the workplace, and that it so far beneﬁ  ted mainly the advancement 
of black males, thus neglecting Asians, Coloureds and white females. Yet, in the early 2000s white females 
outnumbered black females in top management positions by a three to one ratio, and in lower managerial 
positions by a four to one ratio. It seems clear that in management ranks white women are beneﬁ  ting much 
more than black women from gender equity programs (Horwitz et al 2002, 1107; Mathur-Helm 2005, 67). Page ● 69
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The chairman of the Commission for Employment Equality (CEE) has repeatedly concluded that the gov-
ernment’s approach of persuasion of employers obviously does not have the desired effect, with black and 
coloured people bearing the brunt of it. The Labour Minister most recently agreed that the ﬁ  gures showed 
a “disturbing trend”. The 2009 EEA report showed that white men represented 61% of top management in 
both the private and the government sector, black men 10%, Indian men 5%, and coloured men 4%, while 
white women represented 12%, black women just less than 4%, and Indian and coloured women each just 
more than 1%. In government alone, blacks had a 61% share (Williams 2009).
Major companies active in South Africa, especially in export industries, show a development towards the 
adoption of new Human Resource Management (HRM) strategies, applying a range of forms of functional 
ﬂ  exibility and employee participation. More common in South African subsidiaries of multinationals than 
in domestic ﬁ  rms are high-performance work organisations (Horwitz and Smith 1998). Striking is the ﬁ  nd-
ing that such –in capitalist perspective—advanced HR practices do not interfere with the deployment of 
trade union power in the workplace. In many cases where employee participation has been infused, unions 
retained a strong presence. The main area of conﬂ  ict seems pay; performance-related pay and the like re-
mained unpopular among trade unionists (Wood and Glaister 2008).Page ● 70
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Basic information for WageIndicator  3. 
questionnaire
Introduction 3.1. 
Preparations for the DECISIONS FOR LIFE Activities 1.03a and 1.03b have resulted in a number of 
lists, grouped in this Chapter and to be used in the WageIndicator web-survey for country-speciﬁ  c questions 
and their analyses. This basic information can be used on-line, but if needed also off-line. The lists contain 
information on South African trade unions (section 3.2), educational categories and ISCED levels (3.3), 
regions (3.4), racial groups (3.5.1) and languages (3.5.2).
List of trade unions 3.2. 
The country’s trade union movement has already been introduced under Labour relations (section 2.3), 
section. Below, a list, designed for use in the web-survey, can be found of the larger trade unions and all 
those union afﬁ  lated to a national trade union confederation. We did not list the large number (over 100) of 
very small independent trade unions, including unions only operating in one or two provinces. Page ● 72
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Table 11 List of trade unions in South Africa (by 1/1/2009)
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List of educational categories and ISCED levels 3.3. 
Below, a full list of the educational categories used in South Africa, designed for use in the web-survey, 
can be found.
Table 12 List of educational categories in South Africa (by 1/1/2009)
pt_ZA Source label Translation ISCED
710210 ZAF No education / schooling No education / schooling 0
710233 ZAF No formal education but Adult Basic 
Education and Training (ABET)
No formal education but Adult Basic 
Education and Training (ABET) 1
710234 ZAF Some formal education plus Adult Basic 
Education and Training (ABET)
Some formal education plus Adult Basic 
Education and Training (ABET) 1
710211 ZAF Grade R (0) Grade R (0) 1
710212 ZAF Grade 1 / Sub A Grade 1 / Sub A 1
710213 ZAF Grade 2 / Sub B Grade 2 / Sub B 1
710214 ZAF Grade 3 / Standard 1 Grade 3 / Standard 1 1
710215 ZAF Grade 4 / Standard 2 Grade 4 / Standard 2 1
710216 ZAF Grade 5 / Standard 3 Grade 5 / Standard 3 1
710217 ZAF Grade 6 / Standard 4 Grade 6 / Standard 4 1
710218 ZAF Grade 7 / Standard 5 Grade 7 / Standard 5 1
710219 ZAF Grade 8 / Standard 6 / Form 1 Grade 8 / Standard 6 / Form 1 2
710220 ZAF Grade 9/1/ Standard 7 / Form 2 Grade 9/1/ Standard 7 / Form 2 2
710221 ZAF Grade 10 / Standard 8 / Form 3 Grade 10 / Standard 8 / Form 3 3
710222 ZAF Grade 11 / Standard 9 / Form 4 Grade 11 / Standard 9 / Form 4 3
710223 ZAF Grade 12 / Standard 10 / Form 5 Grade 12 / Standard 10 / Form 5 3
710224 ZAF NTC I NTC I 4
710225 ZAF NTC II NTC II 4
710226 ZAF NTC III NTC III 4
710227 ZAF Diploma Diploma 5
710228 ZAF Bachelor’s Degree Bachelor’s Degree 5
710229 ZAF Honours Degree Honours Degree 6
710231 ZAF Masters Masters 6
710232 ZAF Doctorate Doctorate 6Page ● 78
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List of regions 3.4. 
Below, a full draft list of all South African regions, designed for use in the web-survey, can be found.
Table 13 List of regions in South Africa (by 10/16/2008)
pt_ZA pt_ZA Source label Translation Translation
7100100000 7100100131 ZAF Eastern Cape ZAF Eastern Cape Alice Eastern Cape Alice
7100100000 7100100231 ZAF Eastern Cape ZAF Eastern Cape Barkly East Eastern Cape Barkly East
7100100000 7100100331 ZAF Eastern Cape ZAF Eastern Cape Bizana Eastern Cape Bizana
7100100000 7100100431 ZAF Eastern Cape ZAF Eastern Cape Coﬁ  mvaba Eastern Cape Coﬁ  mvaba
7100100000 7100100501 ZAF Eastern Cape ZAF Eastern Cape East London Eastern Cape East London
7100100000 7100100631 ZAF Eastern Cape  ZAF Eastern Cape Engcobo Eastern Cape Engcobo
7100100000 7100100731 ZAF Eastern Cape  ZAF Eastern Cape Flagstaff Eastern Cape Flagstaff
7100100000 7100100831 ZAF Eastern Cape  ZAF Eastern Cape Gcuwa Eastern Cape Gcuwa
7100100000 7100100931 ZAF Eastern Cape  ZAF Eastern Cape Idutywa Eastern Cape Idutywa
7100100000 7100101031 ZAF Eastern Cape  ZAF Eastern Cape Lady Frere Eastern Cape Lady Frere
7100100000 7100101131 ZAF Eastern Cape  ZAF Eastern Cape Libode Eastern Cape Libode
7100100000 7100101231 ZAF Eastern Cape  ZAF Eastern Cape Mount 
Ayliff Eastern Cape Mount Ayliff
7100100000 7100101331 ZAF Eastern Cape  ZAF Eastern Cape Mount 
Fletcher Eastern Cape Mount Fletcher
7100100000 7100101431 ZAF Eastern Cape  ZAF Eastern Cape Mthatha Eastern Cape Mthatha
7100100000 7100101531 ZAF Eastern Cape  ZAF Eastern Cape Ntabankulu Eastern Cape Ntabankulu
7100100000 7100101601 ZAF Eastern Cape  ZAF Eastern Cape Port Eliza-
beth Eastern Cape Port Elizabeth
7100100000 7100101731 ZAF Eastern Cape  ZAF Eastern Cape Port St 
Johns Eastern Cape Port St Johns
7100100000 7100101831 ZAF Eastern Cape  ZAF Eastern Cape Queenstown Eastern Cape Queenstown
7100100000 7100101931 ZAF Eastern Cape  ZAF Eastern Cape Qumbu Eastern Cape Qumbu
7100100000 7100102031 ZAF Eastern Cape  ZAF Eastern Cape Stutterheim Eastern Cape Stutterheim
7100100000 7100102131 ZAF Eastern Cape  ZAF Eastern Cape Umzimkhulu Eastern Cape Umzimkhulu
7100100000 7100109531 ZAF Eastern Cape 
ZAF Eastern Cape Another 







7100100000 7100109632 ZAF Eastern Cape 
ZAF Eastern Cape A small city 
with 10,000 - 100,000 inhabit-
ants
Eastern Cape
A small city 
with 10,000 - 
100,000 inhab-
itants
7100100000 7100109704 ZAF Eastern Cape  ZAF Eastern Cape A village 
with less than 10,000 inhabitants Eastern Cape
A village with 
less than 10,000 
inhabitants
7100100000 7100109805 ZAF Eastern Cape  ZAF Eastern Cape Rural area Eastern Cape  Rural area
7100200000 7100200131 ZAF Free State ZAF Free State Bethlehem Free State Bethlehem
7100200000 7100200231 ZAF Free State ZAF Free State Bloemfontein Free State Bloemfontein
7100200000 7100200331 ZAF Free State ZAF Free State Kroonstad Free State Kroonstad
7100200000 7100200431 ZAF Free State ZAF Free State Parys Free State Parys
7100200000 7100200531 ZAF Free State ZAF Free State Qwa-Qwa Free State Qwa-Qwa
7100200000 7100200631 ZAF Free State ZAF Free State Sasolburg Free State SasolburgPage ● 79
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7100200000 7100200731 ZAF Free State ZAF Free State Senekal Free State Senekal
7100200000 7100200831 ZAF Free State ZAF Free State Welkom Free State Welkom
7100200000 7100209632 ZAF Free State ZAF Free State A small city with 
10,000 - 100,000 inhabitants Free State
A small city 
with 10,000 - 
100,000 inhab-
itants
7100200000 7100209704 ZAF Free State ZAF Free State A village with 
less than 10,000 inhabitants Free State
A village with 
less than 10,000 
inhabitants
7100200000 7100209805 ZAF Free State ZAF Free State Rural area Free State Rural area
7100300000 7100300131 ZAF Gauteng ZAF Gauteng Bronkhorstspruit Gauteng Bronkhorsts-
pruit
7100300000 7100300231 ZAF Gauteng ZAF Gauteng Carletonville Gauteng Carletonville
7100300000 7100300307 ZAF Gauteng ZAF Gauteng East Rand Gauteng East Rand
7100300000 7100300407 ZAF Gauteng ZAF Gauteng Johannesburg Gauteng Johannesburg
7100300000 7100300531 ZAF Gauteng ZAF Gauteng Krugersdorp Gauteng Krugersdorp
7100300000 7100300607 ZAF Gauteng ZAF Gauteng Pretoria Gauteng Pretoria
7100300000 7100300731 ZAF Gauteng ZAF Gauteng Randfontein Gauteng Randfontein
7100300000 7100300831 ZAF Gauteng ZAF Gauteng Vereeniging Gauteng Vereeniging
7100300000 7100300931 ZAF Gauteng ZAF Gauteng Westonaria Gauteng Westonaria
7100300000 7100300632 ZAF Gauteng ZAF Gauteng A small city with 
10,000 - 100,000 inhabitants Gauteng
A small city 
with 10,000 - 
100,000 inhab-
itants
7100300000 7100300704 ZAF Gauteng ZAF Gauteng A village with less 
than 10,000 inhabitants Gauteng
A village with 
less than 10,000 
inhabitants
7100300000 7100300805 ZAF Gauteng ZAF Gauteng Rural area Gauteng Rural area
7100400000 7100400131 ZAF KwaZulu-
Natal ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Bergville KwaZulu-
Natal Bergville
7100400000 7100400307 ZAF KwaZulu-
Natal ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Durban KwaZulu-
Natal Durban
7100400000 7100400531 ZAF KwaZulu-
Natal ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Emangusi KwaZulu-
Natal Emangusi
7100400000 7100400631 ZAF KwaZulu-
Natal ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Eshowe KwaZulu-
Natal Eshowe
7100400000 7100400831 ZAF KwaZulu-
Natal ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Ladysmith KwaZulu-
Natal Ladysmith
7100400000 7100401331 ZAF KwaZulu-
Natal ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Mkuze KwaZulu-
Natal Mkuze
7100400000 7100401431 ZAF KwaZulu-
Natal ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Ndwedwe KwaZulu-
Natal Ndwedwe
7100400000 7100401531 ZAF KwaZulu-
Natal ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Newcastle KwaZulu-
Natal Newcastle
7100400000 7100401631 ZAF KwaZulu-
Natal ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Nkandla KwaZulu-
Natal Nkandla
7100400000 7100401731 ZAF KwaZulu-
Natal ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Nongoma KwaZulu-
Natal Nongoma
7100400000 7100401831 ZAF KwaZulu-
Natal ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Nqutu KwaZulu-
Natal Nqutu
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7100400000 7100402031 ZAF KwaZulu-
Natal ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Pomoroy KwaZulu-
Natal Pomoroy
7100400000 7100402231 ZAF KwaZulu-
Natal




7100400000 7100402331 ZAF KwaZulu-
Natal




7100400000 7100402431 ZAF KwaZulu-
Natal ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Somekele KwaZulu-
Natal Somekele
7100400000 7100402531 ZAF KwaZulu-
Natal ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Stanger KwaZulu-
Natal Stanger
7100400000 7100402631 ZAF KwaZulu-
Natal ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Ulundi KwaZulu-
Natal Ulundi
7100400000 7100402731 ZAF KwaZulu-
Natal ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Umzumbe KwaZulu-
Natal Umzumbe
7100400000 7100402831 ZAF KwaZulu-
Natal ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Vryheid KwaZulu-
Natal Vryheid
7100400000 7100409531 ZAF KwaZulu-
Natal
ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Another 








7100400000 7100409632 ZAF KwaZulu-
Natal
ZAF KwaZulu-Natal A small 




A small city 
with 10,000 - 
100,000 inhab-
itants
7100400000 7100409704 ZAF KwaZulu-
Natal
ZAF KwaZulu-Natal A village 
with less than 10,000 inhabitants
KwaZulu-
Natal
A village with 
less than 10,000 
inhabitants
7100400000 7100409805 ZAF KwaZulu-
Natal ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Rural area KwaZulu-
Natal Rural area
7100800000 7100800131 ZAF Limpopo ZAF Limpopo Bochum Limpopo Bochum
7100800000 7100800231 ZAF Limpopo ZAF Limpopo Burgersfort Limpopo Burgersfort
7100800000 7100800331 ZAF Limpopo ZAF Limpopo Dendron Limpopo Dendron
7100800000 7100800431 ZAF Limpopo ZAF Limpopo Duiwelsklook Limpopo Duiwelsklook
7100800000 7100800531 ZAF Limpopo ZAF Limpopo Greater Giyani Limpopo Greater Giyani
7100800000 7100800631 ZAF Limpopo ZAF Limpopo Greater Grob-
lersdal Limpopo Greater Grob-
lersdal
7100800000 7100800731 ZAF Limpopo ZAF Limpopo Greater Tzaneen Limpopo Greater Tza-
neen
7100800000 7100800831 ZAF Limpopo ZAF Limpopo Lebowakgomop Limpopo Lebow-
akgomop
7100800000 7100800931 ZAF Limpopo ZAF Limpopo Louis Trichardt Limpopo Louis Trichardt
7100800000 7100801031 ZAF Limpopo ZAF Limpopo Moletji Limpopo Moletji
7100800000 7100801131 ZAF Limpopo ZAF Limpopo Ngwaritsi Limpopo Ngwaritsi
7100800000 7100801231 ZAF Limpopo ZAF Limpopo Phalaborwa Limpopo Phalaborwa
7100800000 7100801331 ZAF Limpopo ZAF Limpopo Polokwane Limpopo Polokwane
7100800000 7100801431 ZAF Limpopo ZAF Limpopo Potgietersrus Limpopo Potgietersrus
7100800000 7100801531 ZAF Limpopo ZAF Limpopo Thohoyandou Limpopo Thohoyandou
7100800000 7100809631 ZAF Limpopo ZAF Limpopo A small city with 
10,000 - 100,000 inhabitants Limpopo
A small city 
with 10,000 - 
100,000 inhab-
itants
7100800000 7100809704 ZAF Limpopo ZAF Limpopo A village with 
less than 10,000 inhabitants Limpopo
A village with 
less than 10,000 
inhabitantsPage ● 81
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7100800000 7100809805 ZAF Limpopo ZAF Limpopo Rural area Limpopo Rural area
7100500000 7100500131 ZAF Mpumalanga ZAF Mpumalanga Bushbuck-
ridge Mpumalanga Bushbuckridge
7100500000 7100500231 ZAF Mpumalanga ZAF Mpumalanga Carolina Mpumalanga Carolina
7100500000 7100500331 ZAF Mpumalanga ZAF Mpumalanga Ermelo Mpumalanga Ermelo
7100500000 7100500431 ZAF Mpumalanga ZAF Mpumalanga Greater 
Marble Hall Mpumalanga Greater Marble 
Hall
7100500000 7100500531 ZAF Mpumalanga ZAF Mpumalanga Highveld 
Ridge Mpumalanga Highveld Ridge
7100500000 7100500631 ZAF Mpumalanga ZAF Mpumalanga KwaMhlanga Mpumalanga KwaMhlanga
7100500000 7100500731 ZAF Mpumalanga ZAF Mpumalanga Mdutjana Mpumalanga Mdutjana
7100500000 7100500831 ZAF Mpumalanga ZAF Mpumalanga Middelburg Mpumalanga Middelburg
7100500000 7100500931 ZAF Mpumalanga ZAF Mpumalanga Nelspruit Mpumalanga Nelspruit
7100500000 7100501031 ZAF Mpumalanga ZAF Mpumalanga Nkomazi Mpumalanga Nkomazi
7100500000 7100501131 ZAF Mpumalanga ZAF Mpumalanga Piet Retief Mpumalanga Piet Retief
7100500000 7100501231 ZAF Mpumalanga ZAF Mpumalanga Standerton Mpumalanga Standerton
7100500000 7100501331 ZAF Mpumalanga ZAF Mpumalanga Witbank Mpumalanga Witbank
7100500000 7100509632 ZAF Mpumalanga
ZAF Mpumalanga A small city 
with 10,000 - 100,000 inhabit-
ants
Mpumalanga
A small city 
with 10,000 - 
100,000 inhab-
itants
7100500000 7100509704 ZAF Mpumalanga ZAF Mpumalanga A village 
with less than 10,000 inhabitants Mpumalanga
A village with 
less than 10,000 
inhabitants
7100500000 7100509805 ZAF Mpumalanga ZAF Mpumalanga Rural area Mpumalanga Rural area
7100600000 7100600131 ZAF North West ZAF North West Brits North West Brits
7100600000 7100600231 ZAF North West ZAF North West Delareyville North West Delareyville
7100600000 7100600331 ZAF North West ZAF North West Klerksdorp North West Klerksdorp
7100600000 7100600431 ZAF North West ZAF North West Lichtenburg North West Lichtenburg
7100600000 7100600531 ZAF North West ZAF North West Maﬁ  keng North West Maﬁ  keng
7100600000 7100600631 ZAF North West ZAF North West Mogwase North West Mogwase
7100600000 7100600731 ZAF North West ZAF North West Potchefstroom North West Potchefstroom
7100600000 7100600831 ZAF North West ZAF North West Reivilo North West Reivilo
7100600000 7100600931 ZAF North West ZAF North West Rustenburg North West Rustenburg
7100600000 7100601031 ZAF North West ZAF North West Setla-Kgobi North West Setla-Kgobi
7100600000 7100601131 ZAF North West ZAF North West Temba North West Temba
7100600000 7100601231 ZAF North West ZAF North West Zeerust North West Zeerust
7100600000 7100609632 ZAF North West
ZAF North West A small city 
with 10,000 - 100,000 inhabit-
ants
North West
A small city 
with 10,000 - 
100,000 inhab-
itants
7100600000 7100609704 ZAF North West ZAF North West A village with 
less than 10,000 inhabitants North West
A village with 
less than 10,000 
inhabitants
7100600000 7100609805 ZAF North West ZAF North West Rural area North West Rural area
7100700000 7100700131 ZAF Northern 
Cape ZAF Northern Cape Kimberley Northern 
Cape Kimberley
7100700000 7100700232 ZAF Northern 
Cape ZAF Northern Cape Springbok Northern 
Cape SpringbokPage ● 82
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7100700000 7100700323 ZAF Northern 
Cape ZAF Northern Cape Sutherland Northern 
Cape Sutherland
7100700000 7100709632 ZAF Northern 
Cape
ZAF Northern Cape A small 




A small city 
with 10,000 - 
100,000 inhab-
itants
7100700000 7100709704 ZAF Northern 
Cape
ZAF Northern Cape A village 
with less than 10,000 inhabitants
Northern 
Cape
A village with 
less than 10,000 
inhabitants
7100700000 7100709805 ZAF Northern 
Cape ZAF Northern Cape Rural area Northern 
Cape Rural area
7100900000 7100900707 ZAF Western Cape ZAF Western Cape Cape Town Western Cape Cape Town
7100900000 7100900831 ZAF Western Cape ZAF Western Cape George Western Cape George
7100900000 7100900932 ZAF Western Cape ZAF Western Cape Oudtshoorn Western Cape Oudtshoorn
7100900000 7100901031 ZAF Western Cape ZAF Western Cape Paarl Western Cape Paarl
7100900000 7100901131 ZAF Western Cape ZAF Western Cape Stellenbosch Western Cape Stellenbosch
7100900000 7100901232 ZAF Western Cape ZAF Western Cape Swellendam Western Cape Swellendam
7100900000 7100901331 ZAF Western Cape ZAF Western Cape Worcester Western Cape Worcester
7100900000 7100909632 ZAF Western Cape
ZAF Western Cape A small city 
with 10,000 - 100,000 inhabit-
ants
Western Cape
A small city 
with 10,000 - 
100,000 inhab-
itants
7100900000 7100909704 ZAF Western Cape ZAF Western Cape A village 
with less than 10,000 inhabitants Western Cape
A village with 
less than 10,000 
inhabitants
7100900000 7100909805 ZAF Western Cape ZAF Western Cape Rural area Western Cape Rural area
7109990000 7109990072 ZAF Abroad ZAF Abroad Botswana Abroad Botswana
7109990000 7109990426 ZAF Abroad ZAF Abroad Lesotho Abroad Lesotho
7109990000 7109990508 ZAF Abroad ZAF Abroad Mozambique Abroad Mozambique
7109990000 7109990516 ZAF Abroad ZAF Abroad Namibia Abroad Namibia
7109990000 7109990716 ZAF Abroad ZAF Abroad Zimbabwe Abroad Zimbabwe
7109990000 7109990748 ZAF Abroad ZAF Abroad Swaziland Abroad Swaziland
7109990000 7109990999 ZAF Abroad ZAF Abroad Other country Abroad Other countryPage ● 83
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Lists of racial groups and languages 3.5. 
Racial groups 3.5.1. 
Unlike for other countries and in other DECISIONS FOR LIFE country reports, we adapted the 
phrasing in this section according to the South African (statistical) standards, and listed racial group instead 
of ethnicity. 
Table 14 List of racial groups in South Africa (by 1/1/2009)
pt_ZA Source label Translation
710001 ZAF African African
710002 ZAF White White
710003 ZAF Coloured Coloured
710004 ZAF Asian/Indian Asian/Indian
710999 ZAF Other Other
710998 ZAF Not applicable Not applicable
Languages 3.5.2. 
There are 11 ofﬁ  cial languages in South Africa. Below, a draft list of these languages, designed for use 
in the web-survey, can be found.
Table 15 List of languages in South Africa(by 1/1/2009)
pt_ZA Source label Translation
710092 ZAF English English
710100 ZAF IsiXhosa siXhosa
710101 ZAF IsiZulu IsiZulu
710091 ZAF Afrikaans  Afrikaans
710095 ZAF SeSotho SeSotho
710093 ZAF IsiNdebele IsiNdebele
710094 ZAF Sepedi / Sesotho sa Leboa 
(Northern Sotho)
Sepedi / Sesotho sa Leboa (North-
ern Sotho)
710096 ZAF IsiSwathi IsiSwathi
710097 ZAF IsiTsonga IsiTsonga
710098 ZAF SeTswana SeTswana
710099 ZAF Tshivenda Tshivenda
710999 ZAF Other language OtherPage ● 84
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What is WageIndicator?
WageIndicator has websites in 50 countries. In every country, a national website has a free Salary Check. 
This Check provides detailed information about the wages, on average earned in a wide range of occupations, 
taken into account personal characteristics, such as tenure/age, education, supervisory position, region and 
alike. 
Apart from the Salary Check, the websites in many countries have attractive web-tools, such as Minimum 
Wage Checks, DecentWorkCheck, Gross-Net Earnings Check, and alike. In addition, most websites have 
content about wages, working conditions, labour standards and related topics. Each country has at least one 
website. Multilingual countries have two or more websites. In addition, many countries have websites for target 
groups, for example women or youth. The project website is www.wageindicator.org. 
Worldwide, the national WageIndicator websites attract large numbers of web-visitors; in 2007 in total 
more than 10 million . The websites are consulted by workers for their job mobility decisions, annual perform-
ance talks or wage negotiations. They are consulted by school pupils, students or re-entrant women facing oc-
cupational choices, or by employers in small and medium sized companies when recruiting staff or negotiating 
wages with their employees. 
In return for all free information provided, the web-visitors are encouraged to complete a web-survey, 
which takes 10 to 20 minutes. The survey has detailed questions about earnings, beneﬁ  ts, working conditions, 
employment contract, training, as well as questions about education, occupation, industry, and household 
characteristics. This web-survey is comparable across all countries. The web-survey is continuously posted at 
all WageIndicator websites, of course in the national language(s) and adapted to country-speciﬁ  c issues, where 
needed. The data from the web-survey are used for the calculations, underlying the Salary Check. For occupa-
tions with at least 50 observations in the national database a salary indication can be calculated. The Salary 
Checks are updated annually.
The project started in 2000 in the Netherlands with a large-scale, paper-based survey to collect data on 
women’s wages. In 2001 the ﬁ  rst WageIndicator website with a Salary Check and a web-survey was launched. 
Since 2004, websites were launched in European countries, in North and South America, in South-Africa, and 
in countries in Asia. All large economies of the world currently have a WageIndicator website, among which 
the USA, the Russian Federation, China, India and Brazil. From 2009 onwards, websites will be launched in 
more African countries, as well as in Indonesia and in a number of post-soviet countries. More information 
about the WageIndicator Foundation and its activities can be found at www.wageindicator.org.Page ● 94
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Information about AIAS
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